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DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL: 
TERRORISM, CRIME, AND NATIONAL 




The events of 9-11 presented western democracies with a challenge 
and a test. 1 The challenge: respond to terrorism either by military or 
diplomatic means (such as criminal apprehension and prosecution) to 
address national security needs and to protect civilian populations, 
infrastructure, and commerce. The test: meet the terrorist and national 
* Professor, Graduate School of Management, Department of Criminal Justice and 
Forensic Science, HamJine University, and University of Minnesota Law School. This article was 
originally presented as a paper at the Oxford Round Table conference on criminal law, March 26 -
31, 2006, Oxford University, England, and the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007. I am indebted to all the participants for 
their excellent suggestions and comments. Special acknowledgments go to Ralph Ruebner at the 
John Marshall Law School and David Rudstein of Chicago-Kent College of Law for their insights 
and ideas. 
1 The "events of 9-11" in this Article shall refer to the instances of terrorism taking place 
in the United States on September II, 200 I: the hijacking of several airplanes by al-Qaeda terrorists 
and their subsequent crashing into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon 
building in Washington, D.C., and the downing of another passenger plane in Pennsylvania, which 
was putatively destined for the White House or Capitol. 
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1
Schultz: Democracy on Trial
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
196 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
security challenges while simultaneously respecting international law, 
human rights, domestic constitutionalism, rule of law, and individual 
rights and liberties of both citizens and non-citizens.2 Unfortunately, the 
report card on both the challenge and test reveal a mixed record, 
especially in the United States. 
Following the events of 9-11, the United States has not experienced 
another domestic act of terrorism-leading President Bush to claim that 
the country was winning the war against terrorism.3 But both the United 
Kingdom and Spain were victims of terrorism,4 Australia claimed 
knowledge of an imminent attack,5 and Canada arrested several 
individuals plotting to bomb sites across its nation.6 As a result of the 
events of 9-11, some, such as John C. Yoo, former White House 
Counsel and now Berkeley law professor, have declared that the West 
faces a new war, demanding new security measures that perhaps 
challenge pre-9-11 notions of presidential power and civil liberties. 7 The 
result has been various measures such as the Patriot Act, detention of 
civilians and noncivilians suspected as terrorists, reinterpretations of 
international law or conventions (including the International Convention 
Against Torture and the Geneva Accords), and the use of wiretaps by the 
National Security Agency in the United States. Parallel efforts, both in 
the United Kingdom and Australia, to increase the surveillance, 
detention, and prosecution of suspected terrorists, have also been 
attempted. 8 
2 See, e.g., DAVID DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF 
EMERGENCY 1-2, 17-18 (2006) [hereinafter DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAWI which makes 
a similar point. 
3 See, e.g., The White House, "Waging and Winning the War on Terror" (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocuslachievementlchapl.html) (last visited May 13, 2008) 
(describing how the United States was winning the war on terrorism). 
4 See London rocked by terror attacks, BBC NEWS, July 7, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilukl4659093.stm; Scores die in Madrid bomb carnage, BBC NEWS, Mar. 
11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi1europe/3500452.stm. 
5 Raymond Bonner, Australia to Present Strict Antiterrorism Statute, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2005 at A6 (reporting that Prime Minister John Howard had warned of a potential terrorist attack 
based upon unspecified police and intelligence information). 
6 Ian Austen & David Johnston, 17 Held in Plot to Bomb Sites Across Ontario, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4,2006 at AI. 
7 JOHN C. Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 ix-x (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE]. See also 
MIRKO BAGARIC & JULIE CLARKE, TORTURE: WHEN THE UNTHINKABLE IS MORALLY PERMISSmLE 
4 (2007) (arguing that torture is a legitimate tool to protect the innocent as a result of the events of 9-
11 and the rise of worldwide terrorism). 
8 DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW at 16 (discussing efforts to use indefinite 
detention against aliens suspected of being terrorists, and Tony Blair's proposal for the detaining of 
suspects without charges for up to 90 days. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss2/2
2008] DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 197 
Overall, post 9-11 concerns regarding terrorism in the United States, 
among the members of the European Union ("EU"), and in other western 
democracies have led to the convergence of the traditionally distinct 
policy areas of domestic criminal justice and national security. This 
convergence has produced several policy and institutional conflicts that 
pit individual rights against homeland security, domestic law and 
institutions against international norms and tribunals, and criminal justice 
agencies against national security organizations. As David Dyzenhaus 
aptly describes it, situations such as the West faces in a post 9-11 
environment challenge claims about the viability or the rule of law and 
traditional notions of constitutionalism during emergencies.9 
This Article examines regime responses to international terrorism, 
principally in the United States, in comparison to the European Union, 
and describes the consequences of the merger of criminal justice norms 
with national security imperatives.1O The collapse of criminal justice into 
national security norms has manifested numerous contradictions that 
pose perhaps even more significant challenges to Western European and 
North American style democracies than does international terrorism. 
Specifically, the collapse of the criminal justice norms into national 
security has both threatened civil liberties and augmented claims (at least 
in the United States) of extra-constitutional powers for the president. 
Moreover, while the courts have generally placed some limits on these 
trends, it is not so clear that abuses of individual rights or executive 
power can be reconciled with substantive notions of rule of law and 
constitutionalism. 
Part I of this Article establishes the basic values and norms that 
frame western-style democracies, such as the United States and the states 
of the ED. Part IT examines the development of the war on terrorism in 
the United States, concentrating on actions taken by the Bush 
Administration in response to 9-11, its justification for expansion of 
presidential authority, and the impact both have had upon individual 
liberties. Part ill assesses the Bush Administration's legal arguments for 
the war on terrorism and the expansion of presidential power, by 
discussing how the courts have responded to the government's efforts to 
curtail individual liberties. Part IV briefly switches to the impact of the 
9 1d. at 17,34. 
10 While not the focus of this Article, on November 3, 2005, Australia amended its 
antiterrorism law. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Aust!.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
ComLa w/Legislationl Act l.nsf/0/36EFCECD88B7EF2BCA2570B2000C3E91 /$file/127 -2005.pdf. 
This Act made it easier to prosecute an individual under existing law by dropping the requirement 
that a particular act was terrorist in nature. Instead, one would merely need to show how the act was 
"related" to terrorism. 
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war on terrorism in England and the EU, seeking to provide a contrast to 
approaches found in the United States. 
While recognizing that 9-11 was a tragedy, the response to these 
events has been even more tragic, especially in light of threats to 
individual and civil rights, international law, and democratic processes in 
general. The convergence of national security or intelligence gathering 
with criminal justice, in the name of homeland security and the war on 
terror, has resulted in a war on civil liberties that has undermined 
responses to terrorism and threatened democracy and individual rights. 
I. DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Western European and North American style democracies are 
indebted to a confluence of three political traditions that inform the way 
their institutions operate. These traditions are democracy, liberalism, and 
constitutionalism. 
The concept of "democracy" is very old, dating back to Plato and 
the ancient Greeks who saw it as a rule by the masses. l1 More modern 
notions of democracy labeled it a form of popular government where the 
people rule, either directly or indirectly through their representatives, 
based upon the principle of majority rule. "Liberalism," a concept whose 
origins are often traced to John Locke,12 represents a set of political 
values committed to the protection of individual rights, to polities 
instituted on the basis of the consent of the governed, and to a notion of a 
limited government. 13 Third, "constitutionalism" as a concept is also 
very old, again dating back to the ancient Greeks,14 especially Aristotle, 
and it refers to the basic structures, "grundnorm," or rules that constitute 
a government. 15 As the term has evolved in Western Europe and North 
America, constitutionalism refers to a government of limited powers, 
which often must adhere to rule of law, procedural due process or 
regularity, and a commitment to the protection of individual rights. 16 
II J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 1-5 (1979). 
12 See generally JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge U. Press 1967). 
I3 See generally J. ROLAND PENNOCK & JOHN W. CHAPMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (NYU 
Press 1983). See also GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 1-8 (Beacon 
Press 1959) (describing the differences between democracy and liberalism). 
"CHARLES HOWARD McILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 1-3 (rev. 
ed. 1958). 
15 See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF THE LAW AND STATE (Russell & 
Russell 1961) (describing a "grundnorm" as the constitution or theory of rules for a state.) 
16 JAMES T. McHUGH, COMPARATNE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 5-10 (2002). 
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However, as both Lon Fuller l7 and David Dyzenhaus l8 have argued, 
adherence to rule of law is more than a formal set of rules. For Fuller, 
there are eight requisites to giving the law an inner morality that 
constrains arbitrary actions. 19 Similarly, Dyzenhaus asserts that the inner 
morality of law as described by Fuller is more than a procedural 
adherence to rule of law?O Instead, rule of law imposes a substantive 
limit on the government. Hence, he rejects the idea that there needs to be 
special constitutional rules or powers during emergencies?1 
Together, democratic, liberal, and constitutional values are 
important values in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many, if 
not all, of the European Union member states. 22 Even if the exact 
application of the three values varies across these countries,23 
commitments to majority rule balanced by minority rights, procedural 
regularity, and a government subject to some limits, are shared by many 
countries in the west claiming to be democracies. 
A. UNITED STATES 
The United States of America generally shares in having 
democratic, liberal, and constitutional values that inform its political 
traditions. As conceived in 1787, its Constitution is more specifically 
indebted to a set of political values found in the liberal, republican, and 
legal traditions indebted to John Locke, James Harrington, and William 
Blackstone. 24 The original logic for American government is often 
referred to as Madisonian democracy, a reference to James Madison, one 
of the primary authors of the Constitution.25 He is also one of the authors 
17 LoN fuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 245-53 (Yale University Press 1975). 
18 DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW 10,61 (2006). 
19 fuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LA W at 33-38. 
20 DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LA W at 10. 
21 [d. at 59-62. 
22 Compare c.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL (1973) 
(noting the tensions and strains among varieties or variations of democratic theories and liberal 
theory). 
23 See G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 2046 
(2000) (discussing the differences in how constitutional designs in majoritarian and proportional 
systems affect political accountability). 
24 See generally David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions 
of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 A J. LEGAL. HIST. 464 (1993); LoUIS HARTZ, 
THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION (Harcourt Brace Jovanich 1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN 
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION (Princeton 
University Press, 1975). 
25 ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY: How DOES POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY FUNCTION IN AMERICA? 4-34 (University of Chicago Press 1956) (describing the 
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of the Federalist Papers, which are often described as an authoritative 
gloss on the intent of the constitutional framers. 
Madisonian democracy is depicted as a government set up to 
prevent tyrannies of the majority.26 As described in The Federalist No. 
JO, majority factions pose a threat to the public good or the rights of 
others in traditional republics. 27 To control this threat, Madison 
described the need to create a political system that was socially 
heterogeneous and geographically large, so as to make it more difficult 
for factions to compete. 28 But he also proposed a system of legislative 
supremacy, separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism, 
and federalism as ways to break open concentrations of power and thwart 
the ability of majority factions to form. 29 In addition, factions would be 
encouraged to compete, thereby also reducing the potency and likelihood 
f f d 
. . 30 o anyone rom ommatmg. 
In addition to this design, James Madison subsequently proposed a 
Bill of Rights to offer additional protections for individual rights. These, 
along with other amendments to the Constitution, provide further 
protection for individuals or minorities against majority rule. Moreover, 
as a result of fears of communism and the rise of fascism during the 
middle of the twentieth century, some have argued that Madisonian 
democracy in the United States evolved into a pluralist democracy?1 A 
pluralist democracy is one based upon group competition for political 
power while traditional Madisonian democracy envisions individual 
competition.32 Whatever variant of democracy, the American 
Constitution is one that confers political power. 33 It provides that, absent 
explicit or implied constitutional clauses conferring power upon the three 
branches of the federal government, there is no extra constitutional 
power to act. 
facets or features of Madisonian democracy). 
26 [d. 
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59-61 (James Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937). 
28 [d. 
29 See also LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(1990) for a similar analysis and description of American constitutionalism, especially as it applies 
to foreign affairs. 
30 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 335, 337(James Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed., 1937). 
31 DAVID B.TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION, 6-7,520 (2d ed. 1971). 
32 [d. 
33 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,406 (1819). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss2/2
2008] DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 201 
B. UNITED KINGDOM 
Bernard Bailyn has argued that growing disagreement over what 
representation, constitutionalism, and sovereignty meant were at the core 
of the disputes between America and Great Britain, precipitating the 
American Revolution.34 Bailyn's comments point to some of the 
differences between these governments that would eventually 
characterize the respective countries.35 
While the American political tradition emphasizes the importance of 
a written constitution serving as a limit upon the government, in the 
United Kingdom that is not the case.36 There is no real written 
constitution. Instead there is a series of practices, legislative enactments, 
and documents, such as the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and 
the Petition of Right, that form the British Constitution. In addition, the 
concept of legislative or parliamentary sovereignty seems to make 
Parliament equal to what is constitutional.37 The constitution, then, is not 
something that necessarily limits Parliament since the two are not seen as 
distinct,38 as is the government and the Constitution in the United States. 
A second critical difference between the United States and the 
United Kingdom regards the concept of separation of powers. Even 
though the separation of judicial, executive, and legislative powers into 
the three branches of the American government was augmented by 
checks and balances and some sharing of powers, parliamentary systems 
of government, such as in the United Kingdom, are characterized by 
even less formal notions of separation of powers than in the United 
States.39 For example, while the crown is often considered the 
government, the prime minister and his cabinet are both members of 
Parliament and the government. Similarly, courts are also considered 
part of the government, arising out of the crown.40 
While individual rights can be altered by Parliament, respect for 
them is an important part of the British legal tradition, as is a 
34 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(Belknap Press 1967). 
351d. at 1-9. 
36 D.C.M. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-6 (1984); 
T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LffiERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 4-5 (1994). 
37 YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 31-43. 
38 1d. 
391d. at 75-80; ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM at 183-211. 
40 YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 75-80. 
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commitment to a rule of law.41 Finally, while prior to the ascension of 
William and Mary in the seventeenth century the crown was considered 
to have certain inherent royal prerogatives, they now exist only at the 
pleasure of Parliament.42 
Overall, despite important differences from the United States, the 
British Constitution, like its American counterpart, also seems committed 
to limited government, respect for individual rights, and rule of law as a 
method of enforcing procedural regularity. 
C. EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The various treaties and agreements that have produced the 
European Union have developed a series of political institutions for the 
facilitation of open markets across its member states. Several agreements 
support what is often described as the three pillars of EU. The fIrst pillar 
is the creation of the European Community (EC), built from the 1951 
European Steel and Coal Community, the 1955 European Atomic Energy 
Community, and finally, in 1993, the Treaty on European Union 
("TEU") of Maastricht.43 This treaty, as amended by the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam ("TOA"), created the basic structure of the EC.44 Together, 
the TEU and the TOA forged the second pillar, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy ("CFSP"), and the third pillar, Justice and Home 
Affairs.45 These three pillars constitute the heart of the EU. 
The European Commission approximates an executive branch of 
career civil servants and is headed by twenty-seven Commissioners, 
including the Commission President, who oversee the bureaucracy, 
which is organized into numerous Directorates General. 46 The Council 
of the European Union consists of more political members and has a 
representative from each member state, along with a president who holds 
office for six months, with the office rotating among all the member 
states.47 The European Council consists of a head of state or government 
from each of the member states, and the members of the European 
Parliament are allocated among the different member states. In addition 
411d. 
42 1d. at 53-58. 
43 PAUL CRAIG AND GRAINNE DE BUReA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERIALS 24 
(Oxford University Press 1998). 
44 Id. at 32-33. 
45 1d. 
46 1d. at 50-56. 
47 1d. at 57-58. 
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to there being a variety of special EU boards or institutions, there is the 
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). The 
ECJ is available to adjudicate legal disputes between member states and 
commumties, disputes over EU treaty interpretation, and 
employee/employer disputes, among other issues.48 
The governance and structure of the EU has been criticized as 
suffering from a "democratic deficit.,,49 In addition, when the original 
European Community ("EC") treaties were signed in the 1950's, they 
contained no express provisions for the protection of human rights. 50 The 
ECJ has ruled that the EC could not accede to the European Convention 
of Human Rights ("ECHR,,).51 However, the Court of Justice has used 
its power to create a series of fundamental rights 52 which it has used on 
occasion to annul community laws.53 Among the rights created or 
recognized by the ECJ are the protection of property rights,54 legal 
certainty, 55 a right to a hearing, 56 and equal treatment for men and 
women. 57 The origin of these rights is found in the "constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States.,,58 
Far more important than ECJ construction of fundamental rights, the 
ECHR provides for protection of individual rights in Europe since all 
member states of the EU are also parties to it. 59 Among its major 
provisions are a ban on torture and inhuman treatment,60 a right to liberty 
48 Id. at 79-81. 
49 See STUN SMISMANS, LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: FUNCTIONAL 
PARTICtpATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION 10-15 (2005) (summarizing the criticism of the EU as not 
being sufficiently democratic and accountable to its members or the people). See also, WALTER 
VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES AND PEOPLES (2005) for similar 
discussions of the democratic deficit. 
50 CRAIG AND DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERtALS at 296. 
51 See Opinion 2/94, Re: Accession of the Community to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759. 
52 CRAIG AND DE BlrRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERtALS at 298-301. 
53 See, e.g., Case IlnO, 1nternationale Handelgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fur 
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125. 
54 Case 44n9, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R. 3727. 
55 Case 100/63, Kalsbeek v.Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 1964 E.C.R. 565. 
56 Case 17n4, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 1063. 
57 Case 43n5, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455. 
58 Case 4n3, Nord v. Commission 1974 E.C.R. 491. Compare, STUN SMISMANS, LAW, 
LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: fuNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION 
II (2005) (denying that a common set of European values exist to hold the European Union 
together). 
59T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 138 (Oxford 
University Press 1998). 
60 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 220, available at 
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and security of person,61 and a right to a public hearing and other 
procedural protections if accused and charged with a crime. 62 Overall, 
between the EU and the ECHR, individuals in the EU have fundamental 
rights to be protected against an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is composed of a host of traditions, conventions, 
treaties, and other documents and practices.63 International law, 
especially international humanitarian and human rights law, also affords 
protections to individuals against inhumane treatment, including torture 
and illegal detention. 64 Among sources of international law that apply to 
torture and the treatment of prisoners of war are the 1994 Convention 
against Torture and the various Geneva Conventions governing the 
treatment of combatants and noncombatants.65 Finally, countries, such 
as Israel, have had their highest courts declare torture to be illegal under 
any circumstances.66 
E. SUMMARY 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union 
share a set of values committed to limited government, protection of 
individual rights, and the rule of law as basic precepts of governance.67 
The source of these values lies in domestic and transnational law, 
traditions, and customs. They serve as a cornerstone for democratic 
societies that place limits on the ability of a government, or an individual 
in the government, to claim absolute or unchecked authority to act in 
disregard of these values. In the post 9-11 world, choices made to 
enhance security and to fight the war on terrorism challenged these 
values in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom 
and across the European Union. 
http://conventions.coe.intffreaty/enfTreaties/htmIl005.htm. 
61 Id. at art. 5. 
62 Id. at art. 6. 
63 HELEN DuFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 4-7 (2005). 
MId. at 214, 217. 
651d. at 282-92. 
66 HC] 5100/94 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government ofIsrael 
[1999] IsrSC, 53(4) 817. 
67 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and 1-2 GIOVANNI 
SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED (1987) for good summaries of the shared valued 
of western European style democracies. 
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II. PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE UNITED STATES 
After 9-11, President Bush faced two choices. First, he could have 
responded to the terrorist attacks as criminal acts or as acts of war. 
Second, he could have acted within the law or asserted claims of extra-
constitutional authority. In respect to the first choice, were he to have 
chosen the criminal law route, his options could have included using the 
United Nations, international law, the International Court of Justice, and 
perhaps even the International Criminal Court as forums and bodies to 
deal with terrorism and al-Qaeda, whose members could have been 
prosecuted for various crimes including crimes against humanity.68 
President Bush, however, chose war in two ways. The fIrst was a 
war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the second was a war at home to 
uncover intelligence about terrorists. First, in a speech of September 20, 
2001, President Bush coined the phrase "war on terror" to describe his 
response to the events of 9-11, as well as to his efforts to combat 
terrorism around the world,69 and then on October 7, 2001, in another 
speech, he announced the commencement of military strikes against al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan.7o Second, Bush opted not to respond to the events 
of 9-11 within the law. Instead, in a series of memoranda7l his 
administration offered a theory of a unitary presidency and claims of 
extra constitutional presidential authority to support his militarized 
response to terrorism. But the responses did not end there. 
Within a short period of time after 9-11, Congress acted by passing 
two major pieces of legislation. The fIrst was an act creating the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the second was the Patriot Act. 72 
Less visible or known responses at the time included several presidential 
orders, including those related to the classification and treatment of 
captured or suspected terrorists, and those ordering the National Security 
Agency to wire tap phone calls.73 
68 DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 76-
93. 
69 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl 2001109/20010920-
8.html. 
70 See President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001l10/200 II 007-8.html (announcing the 
commencement of air strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda). 
71 See Part II. 
72 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (200 I); Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
73 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at AI. 
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While President Bush vowed to vanquish terrorism, he also declared 
the lines demarcating victory. First, victory would not be achieved until 
"every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated.,,74 Second, victory could not come at the price of America 
compromising its basic values: 
The object of terrorism is to try to force us to change our way of life, 
is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be what we're not. And 
that's-they're going to fail. They're simply going to fail. I want to 
assure my fellow Americans that our determination-I say "our," I'm 
talking about Republicans and Democrats here in Washington-has 
never been stronger to succeed in bringing terrorists to justice, 
protecting our homeland. Because what we do today will affect our 
children and grandchildren.75 
Exactly what the President meant by "our way of life" was unclear, 
but possibly it included respect for the Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
the rule of law, and individual rights and liberties. 
A. THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE WAR ON DEMOCRACY 
For many, the "way of life" that Bush wished to preserve did not 
seem to include a respect for democracy and constitutionalism, assuming 
both terms incorporated protection for individual rights and liberties. 
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), for one, has been 
sharply critical of the Bush Administration, stating: "Throughout U.S. 
history 'national security' has often been used as a pretext for massive 
violations of individual rights. The terrorist attacks on September 11 
mobilized our country in the fight against terrorism. However, the 
attacks also launched a serious civil liberties crisis.,,76 People for the 
American Way condemned the Patriot Act as launching a "war on terror 
[that] could become a war on all American citizens" because of its failure 
to provide "meaningful judicial review and respect due individual rights 
and liberties.'m Amnesty International has criticized the Bush 
74 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001/09/20010920-
8.htm!. 
75 See President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7,2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001/10120011007-8.html(announcing the 
commencement of air strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda). 
76American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/natsec/index.html(last visited May 
13,2008). 
77 People for the American Way, USA Patriot Act: What's at Stake?, 
http://www.pfaw.orglpfaw/generaVdefault.aspx?oid=9391 (last visited May 13,2008). 
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Administration for its prolonged detention of individuals at Guantanamo 
Bay,78 and the International Red Cross has decried the treatment of 9-11 
detainees by the United States as a violation of international human 
rights law.79 
To describe the full scope of civil liberties criticisms of Bush's war 
on terrorism would take significant space. The criticisms are directed at 
both international actions of the Bush Administration, as well as steps 
taken internally. Internationally, the Bush Administration is criticized 
for disregarding international humanitarian law. The criticism is rooted 
in the Administration's refusal to afford captured al Qaeda and Taliban 
fighters prisoner of war status.80 Criticism has also been directed at the 
Administration's failure to respect international conventions that ban 
torture,81 and thereby encouraging mistreatment of prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.82 In addition, the United States has 
refused to confirm or deny that the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") 
has held alleged terrorists in secret prisons in Eastern Europe where they 
have been tortured.83 Other reports have suggested that the United States 
has targeted journalists and that, in fact, Bush suggested to Prime 
Minister Tony Blair that they target Al Jazeera reporters and stations.84 
Domestically, many, such as the ACLU and People for the 
American Way, as noted above, have criticized the Patriot Act as an 
assault on individual rights and privacy. For example, an American 
Library Association study reports that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation ("FBI") has made at least 200 inquiries to libraries 
regarding reading material and patrons.85 Prior to this study the 
78 Amnesty International, Guantanarno detainees: 4 years without justice, 
http://web.amnesty.orgJpages/usa-100106-action-eng (last visited May 13, 2008). 
79 International Committee of Red Cross, US detention related to the events of II 
September 2001 and its aftermath, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEng/siteengO.nsflhtml/usa-detention-
update-I 2 I 205?OpenDocument (last visited May 13,2008). 
80 See, e.g. HELEN DuFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 249-71 (2005). 
81 See. e.g., id. at 348-73. 
821d. at 348-73,382-85. 
83 Stephen Grey and Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in 2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects. 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A14; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret 
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at AI. See also Lisbeth Kirk, European Courts May Challenge 
US Terror Renditions, EU OBSERVER, Nov. 14,2005, http://euobserver.coml9/20314??print=1 ; 
Craig Whitlock, Europe Wants Answers on CIA Camps, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at Al (noting 
European criticism that the CIA torture camps are illegal and may violate the European Convention 
on Human Rights). 
84 Alan Cowell, Britain Denies Memo Cited in Bush Treat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,2006, at 
A6. 
85 Eric Lichtblau, Libraries Say Yes. Officials Do Quiz Them About Users, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2005, at All. 
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government had not admitted to querying libraries, and, because the 
Patriot Act prevents libraries from divulging whether they had been 
contacted by law enforcement officials, little was known about how 
frequently this authority to query libraries was invoked.86 In addition, 
several states passed resolutions critical of the Act's impact on civil 
liberties,87 and critics in Congress, including Senators Russ Feingold, 
Patrick Leahy, and Arlen Spector, were successful at the end of 
December 2005, in preventing a reauthorization of sixteen expiring 
provisions of the law,88 although eventually the Patriot Act was 
reauthorized,89 supposedly after several problems in the original Act 
were addressed. Among concern of many in Congress was that the law 
allowed for spying on Americans without warrants.90 
Other criticisms of the Bush Administration grow out of a 
December 16, 2005, New York Times story reporting that soon after the 
9-11 attacks, President Bush issued an order authorizing the National 
Security Agency to monitor international telephone conversations and e-
mails by Americans in an effort to uncover links to al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groupS.91 This monitoring or wiretapping was done without 
court-approved warrants, as apparently required by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. In response to this surveillance, 
the ACLU92 and the Center for Constitutional Rights93 filed suits, 
challenging these actions, alleging, among other things, that they violated 
the First Amendment rights of their members and that the President 
lacked authority to order this electronic monitoring. Efforts within the 
Justice Department to examine this issue were also blocked by the 
President. 94 While many in Congress expressed outrage to this 
surveillance, in the summer of 2007 they authorized this activity.95 
86 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I., Using Patriot Act, demands library's Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
26,2005, at A12. (noting that at least one lawsuit challenging these queries, as well as the ban on 
their disclosure by libraries, was filed on August 9,2005 by the ACLU). 
87 Gary Fields and Ann Marie Squeo, Bipartisan Fix for Patriot Act Takes Shape, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4. 
88 Gary Fields and Ann Marie Squeo, Senate Blocks Patriot Act Renewals, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 17-18, 2005, at A3. 
89 P.L. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3 (2006). 
90 ld. 
91 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at AI. 
92 Complaint, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp 2d 754 
(E.D.Mich. 2006). 
93 Complaint, Ctr. for Const. Rights v. Bush, No.1 :06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17,2006). 
94 Neil A. Lewis, Bush Blocked Ethics Inquiry, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,2006, at 
A14. 
95 Carl Hulse & Edmund L. Andrew, Democrats Feel Pressure on Spy Program, N.Y. 
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The Bush Administration also had a secret program examining bank 
records of potentially millions of Americans.96 His administration has 
been criticized for orders authorizing the detaining of both American 
citizens and non-citizens suspected of being terrorists, when those 
individuals are either denied access to attorneys (or have their 
conversations with them monitored) or civil courtS.97 Finally, The New 
York Times reported that the FBI monitored numerous advocacy groups 
after 9-11 without suspected terrorist connections, including Greenpeace 
and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.98 
President, Bush's approach to civil liberties can best be captured by 
his September 20, 2001 speech to Congress when he fIrst declared the 
war on terrorism: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to 
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this 
day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will 
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.,,99 Bush's 
declaration of the war on terrorism, as well as his divisive you-are-with-
us-or-the-enemy statement, divided the world between good and evil, 
posturing himself into the position of McCarthyiting any who would 
oppose him or his measures. The cost of this McCarthyism is the war on 
democracy and civil liberties. 
B. PATRIOT ACT 
The war on terrorism breached a wall traditionally distinguishing 
foreign policy, national security, and intelligence gathering from 
domestic law enforcement. 100 Domestic law enforcement is a policy area 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at AI. 
96 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at AI. 
91 Att'y. Gen. Order No. 2529-2001,66 Fed. Reg. 55,062 (Oct. 31, 2001). 
98 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2005, at AI. 
99 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re\easesl200 1/091200 10920-8.html. 
100 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 9111 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (authorized ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 
COMM' N REPORT) (stating that "[al central provision" of the Administration proposal that became 
the Patriot Act "was the removal of 'the wall' on information sharing between the intelligence and 
law enforcement communities"). See also Paul Rosenzweig, Civil liberty and the Response to 
Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 688 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: 
States of Exception and the Temptations of 9111, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 100 I, 1038 (2004); Peter 
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1327 
(2004) (describing the goal of the Patriot Act as tearing down the wall between law enforcement and 
foreign intelligence gathering). 
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that must respect the constitutional protections and due process rights of 
those suspected of committing crimes. These requirements include the 
Fourth Amendment warrant and search and seizure requirements,101 the 
Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent,102 and the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel,103 among other rights. However, foreign intelligence 
gathering is generally exempt from a rigid application of these 
protections. 104 As a result, if domestic law enforcement need only follow 
the legal standards of foreign intelligence gathering, individual rights and 
due process protections stand a good chance of being sacrificed. 105 One 
of the first instances of how the Bush Administration subsumed crime 
control under national security imperatives was in the Patriot Act. 
Signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001, the Patriot 
Act lO6 was described by President Bush as an important tool in the war 
on terrorism. The law was meant to overcome difficulties in 
investigating acts of domestic terrorism by enhancing the capacity of 
criminal justice officials to draw upon intelligence information. One 
analyst has summarized the statute as follows: 
The Act grants federal officials greater powers to trace and intercept 
terrorists' communications both for law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence purposes. It reinforces federal anti-money laundering 
laws and regulations in effect to deny terrorists the resources 
necessary for future attacks. It tightens our immigration laws to close 
101 See generally, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
bars the use of illegally obtained evidence (without a search warrant) to convict an individual of a 
crime); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
102 See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment recognizes the right of a suspect in custody to remain silent); Miranda v Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
103 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.s. 335 (1963) (holding that individuals 
charged with a felony have a right to counsel, included an appointed one if indigent, under the Sixth 
Amendment). 
104 See, e.g, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) 
(stating that "[nleither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in 
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens," foreclosed any claim by respondent to Fourth 
Amendment rights. More broadly, he viewed the Constitution as a "compact" among the people of 
the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were expressly limited to "the 
people"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259, 266 ("The available historical data 
show, therefore, that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United 
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision 
was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United 
States territory"). 
lOS See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model 
to Domestic Low Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2004). 
Hl6 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002), (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ I 
-1016 (2008 Westlaw). 
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our borders to foreign terrorists and to expel those amongst us. 
Finally it creates a few new federal crimes, such as the one outlawing 
terrorists' attacks on mass transit; increases the penalties for many 
others; and institutes several procedural changes, such as a longer 
statute of limitations for crimes of terrorism. 107 
211 
Among the major provisions of the Act's more than 300 pages are 
ten separate sections that revise intelligence gathering, immigration, 
criminal justice, and money laundering laws as they relate to fighting 
terrorism. 108 One sees in the Act a consolidation of crime control into 
foreign intelligence gathering with the centralization of some domestic 
investigations under the director of the CIA. 109 
More specifically, among the major provisions of the Patriot Act, 
section II amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
including authorization of disclosure or sharing of grand jury information 
containing foreign intelligence to federal officials. 11O It also enhanced 
the ability of the federal government to use pen registers to intercept 
electronic communications, including the Internet, and for roving 
surveillance of devices such as cell phones. III This information could 
now be shared with the CIA director. 112 Another provision of Part II 
provided delayed notification of required notices of execution of 
warrants (the so called "sneak and peak" provision).113 Among the more 
controversial features of the Act, it makes it possible to search many 
private records, including medical and library information, without 
having to show reasonable suspicion as required under the Fourth 
Amendment. 114 The Act also permitted the searching of library records 
and a ban of disclosure of such searches or inquiries. 115 Overall, the 
Patriot Act has been criticized by many as threatening civil liberties and 
indi vidual rights because it has unnecessarily conflated national security 
107 CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A 
LEGAL ANAL YSIS 54-57 (Apr. 15, 2002). 
lOS Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 Loy. U. 
CHI. L.J. 933, 965 (2002). 
109 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(6) (Supp. 2002). See also John W. Whitehead & Steven H. 
Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security:" A Constitutional Analysis of the 
USA Patriot Act the Justice Department's Anti-terrorism Initiatives 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091 
(2002). 
110 18 U.S.C.A § 203 (West law 2008). 
11118 U.S.C.A §§ 204-09 (Westlaw 2008). Section 206 allows for wire tapping of specific 
individuals and not just devices such as telephones. 
112 18 U.S.C.A § 203(b) (Westlaw 2008). 
113 18 U.S.C.A § 213 (Westlaw 2008). 
114 18 U.S.C.A § 218 (Westlaw 2008). 
lIS 18 U.S.C.A § 215 (Westlaw 2008). 
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and domestic law enforcement standards."6 
C. ASSERTION OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS AND A UNIFIED 
EXECUTIVE 
[Vol. 38 
Congress, through the Patriot Act, putatively gave the President the 
authority to engage in increased domestic surveillance by way of 
congressional fiat. In addition, a congressional joint resolution, the 
Authorization to Use Military Force ("AVMF") of September 18, 2001, 
authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001,... in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations, or persons.,,))7 It has been interpreted as granting the 
President extensive power to respond to the terrorist attacks. 118 
However, beyond congressional or legislative authorization, four Justice 
Department- memoranda also asserted inherent or extra-constitutional 
presidential power to respond to terrorism. These memoranda include a 
September 25,2001 Department of Justice opinion written by John Yoo 
which describing presidential war making powers ("the Y 00 
Memorandum"), and a second legal opinion of January 22, 2002 
addressing the treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees ("the 
Detainee Memorandum,,).))9 The third memorandum is from August 1, 
116 See, e.g., Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: the USA Patriot Act of 2001 33 
Loy. U. CHI. L.1. 933, 965 (2002); Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look into 
Civil Liberty Concerns in the Information Age under the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and a Proposed 
Constitutional Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 447 (2003); Rita 
Shulman, USA Patriot Act: Granting the U.S. Government the Unprecedented Power to Circumvent 
American Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 427 (2003); 
John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland 
Security:" A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti· 
terrorism Initiatives 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1081, 1091 (2002). 
117 Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
118 Despite this resolution authorizing force, Congress also ambiguously stated in section 2 
that the statutory authorization to use force arose from the War Powers Resolution and also in 
section I that the president "has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent 
acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id. at §2(b). See also Curtis A. Bradley 
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 2048,118 HARV. L. 
REv. (2005) (discussing the legal implications of this resolution in tenns of the scope of presidential 
power to respond to the events of 9·11). 
119 John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum 
Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President Re: The President's Constitutional Authority To 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001) 
[hereinafter Yoo Memorandum), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oIc/warpowers925.htm;Jay S. 
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2002, reviewing the classification and treatment of al-Qaeda held outside 
the United States, while the fourth is a January 19, 2006 Department of 
Justice memorandum supporting President Bush's decision to order the 
warrantless wiretapping of telephone conversations by the National 
Security Agency. 
These four memoranda, taken together, frame the Bush 
Administration's arguments for its foreign policy and national security 
authority post 9-11 by asserting a unitary conception of presidential 
power that appears to be exempt from congressional oversight or 
regulation in foreign affairs and in the conduct of war. While such an 
argument for presidential power may be questionable itself, its 
combination with the collapse of domestic criminal justice activity into 
foreign affairs has resulted in a significant broadening of claims of 
presidential powers in domestic and international affairs such that it 
threatens basic constitutional norms and a respect for individual rights. 
1. September 25,2001 Memorandum, the Yoo Memorandum 
The Y 00 Memorandum argued that the president has extensive 
inherent authority to use force against terrorists. 120 To substantiate this 
claim, Y 00 relied upon the structure of the Constitution, judicial and 
executive construction of the Constitution, recent practice and tradition, 
and finally congressional enactments authorizing use of force. 121 First, in 
terms of the structure of the Constitution, Y 00 drew heavily upon the 
Founders' constitutional intent, especially as glossed by Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist. 122 For example, Yoo argued that: 
The text, structure and history of the Constitution establish that the 
Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and 
therefore the power, to use military force in situations of emergency. 
Article II, Section 2 states that the "President shall be Commander in 
Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzalez, 
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 
Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), available 
at http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/torture/powtorturememos.html. 
120 The arguments found in this memorandum were subsequently elaborated upon in JOHN 
C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9111 
(2005). 
121 Y 00 Memorandum at I. 
122 Yoo Memorandum at 2 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 122 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Charles R. Kesler ed., 1999) (stating regarding presidential war powers, that "the circumstances 
which may affect the public safety are [notl reducible within certain determinate limits, ... it must 
be admitted, as a necessary consequence that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to 
provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficiency."). 
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Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. He is further vested with all of 
"the executive Power" and the duty to execute the laws. U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 1. These powers give the President broad constitutional 
authority to use military force in response to threats to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States. During the period 
leading up to the Constitution's ratification, the power to initiate 
hostilities and to control the escalation of conflict had been long 
understood to rest in the hands of the executive branch.123 
For Yoo, the text of the Constitution, vests "full control" of military 
powers in the president to direct military operations, even absent 
congressional declarations of war. 124 The basis for this claim rested upon 
a specific views of the presidency, again attributed to Hamilton, that 
asserts that the constitutional text creates a unified executive power or 
presidency.125 It is this unified conception of the presidency, along with 
the conveyance of executive power to the president, and a historical view 
of war powers and foreign policy activity as an executive function, that 
gives the president the exclusive power that it has in national security and 
defense issues. 126 
Second, judicial and executive construction, according to the Yoo 
Memorandum, also endorses a strong view of presidential power in 
national security issues. In terms of executive construction, part n of 
the Memorandum outlines numerous occasions where the Attorney 
General or the Justice Department has supported presidential supremacy 
if not exclusivity in this policy area. For example, Y 00 cites opinions of 
Attorneys General William Barr, Frank Murphy, and Thomas Gregory as 
arguing that the president had inherent constitutional authority to commit 
troops overseas, or to take military action without congressional 
approval, in anticipation of events that would eventually lead to World 
Wars I and n.127 Furthermore, Yoo argued, the judiciary has endorsed 
these executive readings of the Constitution. 128 For example, in Mitchell 
v. Laird,129 a district court, in ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Vietnam War, stated that "there are some types of war which without 
123 Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted). 
I24 Id. at 1-3. 
125 Yoo Memorandum at 2-3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 392, No. 74, at 415 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1999). 
l26yoo Memorandum at 3-4. 
127Id. at 6. 
I28 Id. at 8. 
I29 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. CiT. 1973). 
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Congressional approval, the President may begin to wage: for example, 
he may respond immediately without such approval to a belligerent 
attack. ,,130 
Appeal to practice and tradition is a third argument Yoo offered to 
support presidential exclusivity in national security matters. Specifically, 
Y 00 cited what he claims are at least 125 times in American history 
where troops have been committed overseas by the president without 
congressional approval. 131 This deference to presidential authority is a 
reflection, for Y 00, of the practical needs of the Constitution to afford 
flexibility in assigning responsibility in the area of national security. 132 
Finally, Yoo pointed to both the War Powers Resolution and the 
September 18, 2001 congressional resolution as also demonstrating 
"Congress's acceptance of the President's unilateral war powers in an 
emergency situation like that created by the September 11 incidents.,,133 
Invoking Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. that presidential power in foreign affairs is at its maximum 
when given legislative support by Congress, 134 according to Y 00 these 
two acts of Congress clearly endorse that the president has broad if not 
exclusive and unlimited power to acts in foreign affairs and national 
security matters. 
What are the overall implications of the Yoo Memorandum? First, 
as asserted in the conclusion of his memorandum, Y 00 argued that the 
president has "plenary constitutional power" to take military action, as he 
deems appropriate, to respond to terrorist attacks. 135 This power is 
inherent, Y 00 argued, regardless of what Congress authorized in either 
the War Powers or AUMF resolutions. 136 As subsequently articulated in 
his book, Y 00 views the president as having total control over foreign 
and military powers, with Congress confined merely to either terminating 
funding or authorization if it disapproves of what the executive branch 
does.137 Third, Y 00' s memorandum sketched out a theory of a unified 
executive and president with strict separation of powers, again leaving no 
room for Congress or the courts in the field of national security. Fourth, 
130 Id. at 613. 
131 Yoo Memorandum at 10. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 15. 
134 Id. at 14 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
my 00 Memorandum at 17. 
136 1d. Y 00 also cites the September 18, 200 I resolution as the September 14, 200 I 
resolution. 
137 JOHN C. Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/1 I 40 (2005). 
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in the conclusion of the Memorandum Y 00 also states that the president 
can deploy troops not just to retaliate but to prevent future attacks, 138 
thereby providing the rationale for the Bush Administration's claim of 
"anticipatory self-defense" and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Finally, the Memorandum seemed to suggest, and actually did state, that 
there appears to be no limit to presidential power in the field of national 
security, thereby setting the stage for expansion of chief executive 
authority to make claims for expanded capacity to act beyond the text of 
the Constitution. 
2. January 22,2002 Memorandum, the Detainee Memo 
A second legal opinion critical to the Bush Administration's 
assertion of presidential power to undertake the war on terrorism is the 
January 22,2002 memorandum addressing the treatment of al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees ("Detainee Memorandum"),139 which was drafted for 
then Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales by the Department of 
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. This memorandum sought to 
ascertain the application of international treaties, such as the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("Geneva III") 
and federal law to captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. 140 
This memorandum concluded that Geneva III did not apply to al Qaeda 
and that the president could also conclude that its protections do not 
extend to members of the Taliban militia. 141 
In seeking to analyze the applicability of Geneva III, the 
Memorandum undertook a historical overview of the type of conflict and 
participants the Convention was supposed to cover. In doing so, it first 
noted that Geneva III structures "legal relationships between nation-
states, not between nation-States and private, transnational or subnational 
groups or organizations.,,142 Second, in examining the type of conflict 
Geneva III (and all the other Geneva Conventions) were supposed to 
cover, the Memorandum asserted that Geneva III is directed to a 
"condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed conflict between a State 
138 Y 00 Memorandum at 17. 
139 Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for 
Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 
(January 22, 2002) [hereinafter Detainee Memorandum), available at 
http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsltorturelpowtorturememos.html. 
140 [d. at I. 
141/d. 
142 [d. at 4. 
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and an armed movement within its own territory.,,143 Thus, the framers 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions only had in mind armed conflicts 
between nation-states and civil war within a nation-state. l44 It is in these 
types of armed conflicts, the memorandum argues, that Geneva III 
should be read. 145 
Having set this context, the Memorandum then reviewed a history 
of warfare and conflict leading up to the 1949 Accords. It concluded 
that only "state-centered" types of conflicts were envisioned in the 
writing of Geneva III, and it is this type of warfare that the United States 
had in mind when it ratified this treaty. 146 The Memorandum then 
switches direction slightly, arguing that because state-centered conflict 
was the type of warfare contemplated by Geneva ill, it did not apply to 
all type of conflicts. Had "state parties ... intended the Conventions to 
apply to all (emphasis in the original) forms of armed conflict, they could 
have used broader, clearer language," according to the Memorandum. 147 
But given the history and context at the time, the Memorandum argued, 
the Geneva Convention drafters could not have contemplated that it 
would address conflict between a nation-state and an international 
terrorist group such as al Qaeda. 148 Therefore, the Memorandum 
concluded, Geneva III does not apply to al Qaeda and they do not qualify 
for prisoner of war ("POW") treatment. 149 
Turning to the Taliban, the Memorandum noted that the application 
of Geneva III to them was a more difficult legal question. 150 To resolve 
this issue, the Memorandum noted that Article II of the Constitution 
makes the president both Comrnander-in-Chief and vests in him the 
executive power. 151 Relying on historical and textual arguments similar 
to those found in the Yoo Memorandum, the Detainee Memorandum 
asserted that the Constitution vests in the president independent plenary 
foreign policy power, including any unenumerated powers that deal with 
foreign affairs, including those that address treaties. 152 It concludes that 
if treaty power is an executive function, and if the president has the 
143/d. at 6. 
144/d. at 7. 
145 Detainee Memorandum at 7. 
146/d. at 8. 
147/d. (emphasis in the original) 
148/d. at 8. 
149/d. at 9. 
150 /d. at 10. 
151 Detainee Memorandum at II. 
152 /d. at I I. 
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power alone to suspend or continue treaties,153 then he also has the lesser 
power of temporarily suspending treaties. 154 
Having argued that Geneva III only applies to nation-states and that 
the president has plenary power to suspend (and, implicitly, to interpret) 
treaties, the Memorandum argued that the president could conclude that 
Afghanistan is a "failed state" or a state in which authority has 
collapsed. 155 If, int fact the president could find that Afghanistan was a 
failed state,156 he could then also decide that Geneva III does not apply 
to the Taliban, and therefore temporarily suspend the treaty obligations 
towards them. Under such circumstances, the Memorandum argued, 
while Geneva III is not binding on the United States as a matter of 
international law, 157 the president might apply it, or lesser standards, as a 
matter of policy.15S 
The significance of the Detainee Memorandum is great. First, it 
relied on a logic of executive branch power in foreign affairs that 
parallels the Yoo Memorandum. Second, it argued that POW status, as a 
matter of law, does not have to be granted to either the al-Qaeda or 
Taliban detainees. Third, it asserted that is a matter of policy to 
determine what status al-Qaeda and Taliban captives should be afforded 
and, therefore, what treatment they should receive. In terms of what 
status and treatment they should receive, a January 25, 2002 
Memorandum from Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales to the 
president ("the Application Memorandum") described the war against 
terrorism as a "new kind of war.,,159 Because of that, the Application 
Memorandum argued that the "new paradigm [of conflict] renders 
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners 
and renders quaint some of its provisions" regarding their treatment. 160 
153 Id. at 12 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (1793), reprinted in IS THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 19690 for this proposition). 
154 ld. at 12-13. 
155 1d. at IS. 
156 ld. at 16-22 (discussing historical factors and conclusions, some of which were made by 
the executive branch, concluding that Afghanistan and the Taliban regime constituted a failed state). 
157 Detainee Memorandum at 23-25 does discuss whether a decision to suspend the treaty 
would be valid under international law. Two arguments are made. First, any breaches of 
international law would not be binding on domestic law in the United States. Id. Second, nothing in 
the Geneva Conventions says that they cannot be temporarily suspended and therefore the president 
may do this. Id. 
158 1d. at 25. 
159 Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Memorandum to the President Re: 
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI 
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Application Memorandum), available at 
http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsltortureipowtorturememos.htmI. 
160 Id. at 2. 
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Finally, were the logic of this memorandum accepted, the president 
would appear to be able to exempt anyone who tortures from criminal 
liability anyone who tortures. 161 The Detainee and Application 
Memoranda thus set the putative legal authority of the president to 
classify both al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees as "enemy combatants" 
who would be afforded presidentially-designated treatment at 
Guantanamo Bay and other facilities outside the United States. 
3. August 1,2002 Memorandum, the Gonzales Memo 
The August 1, 2002 Memorandum prepared by the Department of 
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel for Counsel to the President Alberto 
Gonzales discussed the standard of conduct or treatment for those 
captured or detained as a result of the war on terrorism. 162 Better known 
as the "torture memo," the memorandum examined what type of conduct 
can be conducted in interrogations outside the United States, consistent 
with the Convention Against Torture and 18 U.S.c. §§ 2340-2340A. 163 
In summary, the Memorandum concluded that only acts of "extreme 
nature"-equivalent to that found in death, organ failure, or serious 
bodily injury--constitute torture and that merely cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading action does not rise to the level of a violation of either the 
Convention Against Torture or section 2340A. 164 1 
To reach these conclusions, the Memorandum first turned to 18 
U.S.C. § 2340A which makes it a criminal offense for anyone outside the 
United States to commit, or attempt to commit, torture. 165 Torture is 
defined in section 2340 as an "act committed by a person acting under 
the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering... upon another person.,,166 The Memorandum 
contended that § 2340A applies only if the specific intent was to inflict 
pain as the defendant's precise objective. 167 If, however, the defendant 
acts with the belief that such pain was only reasonably likely as a result 
of his actions, then there is only general intent and therefore the act does 
161 Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L. J. 1145, 1151 
(2006). 
162 Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 
U.s.c. §§2340-2340A (Aug. I, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum], available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/ nati on/documents! doj i nterrogationmem02002080 I . pdf. 
163 1d. at I. 
164ld. 
165 Id. at 2. 
166 ld. at 3. 
167 Id. at 3-4. 
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not apply as torture under the law. 168 Thus, if the goal is to inflict serve 
pain, then it is torture, but if in the course of interrogation pain is 
inflicted in order to extract information, that does not qualify as torture 
because inflicting pain was not the goal of the conduct. 169 
Second, the Memorandum noted that only "severe pain" is barred 
by section 2340. 170 In seeking to interpret what severe pain is, the 
Memorandum drew upon 18 U.S.c. §2340A to conclude that it 
encompasses only severe mental pain or suffering, threat of imminent 
death, or the use of drugs which profoundly disrupt the senses or 
personality. 171 
The Memorandum next turned to the Convention Against Torture 
("CAT") to ascertain what it prohibits. The Memorandum again noted 
that the CAT prohibits only severe pain or suffering,172 but unlike section 
2340, does not appear to have a specific intent requirement. 173 However, 
to support a reading that CAT only applies to extreme forms of physical 
or mental harm, the Memorandum appealed to executive branch 
interpretations of the treaty. It cited Reagan Administration views that 
the interrogation must use deliberate and calculated techniques "intended 
to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or 
suffering." 174 
Finally, after a brief review of how other bodies and states have 
viewed torture,175 the Gonzales Memorandum then articulated a similar 
logic regarding preSidential power as found in the Y 00 Memorandum. 
Specifically, the former contended that even if interrogation methods 
used violated section 2340A, this statute would be unconstitutional 
because it interfered with the president's "core war powers.,,176 Because 
the president enjoys "complete discretion" in terms of how to use his 
commander-in-chief powers and because executive power is invested in 
168 Gonzales Memorandum at 4. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 5. 
171 [d. at7-11. 
172 [d. at 14. 
173 [d. 
174 Gonzales Memorandum at 16 (citing S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 4-5 (1988)). See 
also Gonzales Memorandum at 20 (dismissing non-executive branch interpretations by stating that 
beyond "statements of Executive branch officials, the rest of the ratification record is oflittle weight 
in interpreting a treaty"). Presumably this statement encompasses Senate debate on the Convention 
Against Torture. 
175 Gonzales Memorandum at 27-31 (noting also how such international decisions are not 
binding on the United States). 
176 [d. at 31. See also id. at 38 (arguing that "capturing, detaining, and interrogating 
members of the enemy" is a core function of the Commander in Chief). 
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the president,177 laws, including section 2340A, the memorandum argues, 
must be read so as note to interfere with his constitutional authority. 178 
To summarize, the memorandum argues that section 2340A only 
applies to severe physical or mental suffering if the specific intent is to 
inflict this type of pain. Additionally, presidential interpretations of CAT 
only bar this type of infliction of pain. Third, even if section 2340A does 
apply, it would be unconstitutional if it also interfered with presidential 
war-making powers. How do we know if it does interfere? It seems 
mere presidential declaration that it does is sufficient. 
4. January 19, 2006 Memorandum, the Wiretapping Memo 
The fourth memorandum that frames the Bush Administration's 
legal justification for the war on terrorism is the January 19, 2006 
Memorandum defending the president's ability to order wiretapping of 
telephone conversations without a warrant ("Wiretapping 
Memorandum"). 179 
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times broke a story reporting 
that soon after the 9-11 attacks, President Bush issued an order 
authorizing the National Security Agency ("NSA") to monitor 
international telephone conversations and e-rnails by Americans in an 
effort to uncover links to al Qaeda and other terrOl;ist groups. 180 This 
monitoring or wiretapping was done without court-approved warrants, as 
apparently required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978. 181 Subsequently, on December 17, President Bush acknowledged 
that he ordered the spying,182 with the exact scope of the number of 
individuals or communication spied on unknown. 183 Significant 
177 Id. at 33. 
178 1d. at 34. 
179 V.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President (January 19, 2006) [hereinafter Wiretapping 
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. 
180 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005 at AI. 
181 Id. See also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (UFISA") as amended, 50 V.S.C.A. 
§§ 1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Passed in light of revelations that Richard Nixon had ordered 
domestic spying on personal enemies and reporters, FISA constructed a process whereby the 
president could obtain a warrant from a special federal court to place wiretaps telephones and other 
communication devices, if needed for national security and intelligence gathering reasons. In some 
cases, the wiretaps could be authorized prior to a warrant being issued, but one had to be obtained 
from the special court within three days. 
182 David E. Sanger, In Speech, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18,2005, at AI. 
183 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, 
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controversy followed this revelations of spying, with members of 
Congress, such as Senator Arlen Spector, contending that the president 
had violated FISA. This forced the president to defend the program 
numerous times, culminating in the January 19,2006 memorandum. 
The Wiretapping Memorandum retraced similar ground as the other 
three memoranda in terms of assertions of presidential power. It too 
cited the Article II vesting of the executive and commander-in-chief 
powers in the president as creating a unitary chief executive who is 
preeminent in the field of national security and defense. l84 In addition to 
again relying heavily upon Alexander Hamilton's views on executive 
power,185 the Wiretapping Memorandum also relied upon dicta in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation l86 describing the president 
as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations. ,,187 
The Memorandum then concluded that because of his preeminent 
authority in national affairs, "a consistent understanding has developed 
that the President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct 
warrantless searches and surveillance within the United States for foreign 
intelligence purposes.,,188 To support this conclusion, the Memorandum 
cited legal opinions by previous attorneys general189 as well as lower 
federal court opinions l9o and Supreme Court dicta. 191 After asserting this 
inherent presidential power, the Wiretapping Memorandum, like the 
other three Memoranda, cited the September 18, congressional 
Authorization to Use Military Force as additional support for the 
president to order warrantless wiretaps. More importantly, it is this 
congressional authorization that was viewed by the Memorandum as 
provideing the legal justification to bypass FISA. 192 
According to the Wiretapping Memorandum, FISA regulates 
electronic surveillance when it is in the context of gathering foreign 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at AI. 
I84 WireIapping Memorandum at 6-7. 
I85 Id.at7. 
186 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
187 299 U.S. at 319; Wiretapping Memorandum at 6. 
188WireIapping Memorandum at 7. 
189/d. at 8. 
190 /d. See also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
191 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement applies to investigations of domestic threats to security). The 
WireIapping Memorandum at 8, argues that because the Court had not ruled on the President's 
authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance without a warrant and that subsequently lower 
courts had concluded the president could do this, therefore he did have this authority. 
192 WireIapping Memorandum at 2. 
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intelligence information. 193 The Act requires the Attorney General to 
obtain a warrant from a special court of Article ill judges if it wishes to 
engage in electronic surveillance. In addition, FISA requires that the 
warrant application must show probable cause to believe the person or 
agent targeted is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. The NSA 
must also certify that the information sought is foreign intelligence and 
that it cannot be obtained by normal domestic means. l94 According to 
the Wiretapping Memorandum, Congress did not intend FISA either to 
limit presidential power in time of war, or to prohibit him from engaging 
in all forms of electronic surveillance. 195 Instead, section 109 of FISA 
only prohibits such surveillance "except as authorized by statute. ,,196 
The September 18, 2001 congressional AUMF resolution, according to 
the Memorandum, is then described as a "statute" authorizing electronic 
surveillance within the meaning of section 109 of FISA.,,197 Finally, the 
Memorandum argued that even if there are questions about whether 
FISA or the Fourth Amendment '98 barred the wiretapping, the 
interpretive rule of seeking to avoid constitutional questions should 
weigh on the side of the president's authority. 199 
In sum, the surveillance of telephone and e-mail communications is 
legal because: 1) the president has inherent power to act in national 
affairs; or 2) FISA does not prevent it;200 or 3) FISA allows for some 
exceptions and Congress authorized it with its September 18 resolution; 
or 4) the Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign intelligence 
gathering or NSA activities; or 5) the rule of constitutional avoidance 
should weigh in favor of executive authority. 
193 [d. at 18. 
194 [d.; See also 50 U.S.c.A. §§ 1803-1805 (Westlaw 2008). 
195 Wiretapping Memorandum at 19-20. 
196[d. at 20 (italics in the original). 
197 [d. at 23. 
198 [d. at 36-38 (dismissing Fourth Amendment objections by asserting that the courts have 
affirmed presidential authority to gather foreign intelligence without a warrant, or that the warrant 
requirement does not apply to activities of the NSA). 
199 [d. at 28. 
200 Compare, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. 
§204 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (stating that "nothing in code provisions regarding pen registers shall 
be deemed to affect the acquisition by the Government of specified foreign intelligence information, 
and that procedures under FISA shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and 
the interception of domestic wire and oral (current law) and electronic communications may be 
conducted") (italics added). 
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5. Presidential Signing Statements 
Presidential signing statements have been tactically used by the 
Bush Administration to reinforce executive power, especially in the areas 
of foreign policy and military affairs. These statements, issued at the 
time when the president signs a bill, have been around since the early 
days of the republic.201 However, it was Attorney General Edwin Meese 
during the Reagan presidency who pushed the idea of using signing 
statements as a way of interjecting the intent or understanding of the 
president regarding what a particular law meant. The hope was to then 
have this interpretation of the law guide judicial construction of it in 
court. 202 Yet the Bush presidency has transformed the signing statements 
into a major tool to defend its conception of presidential power as 
articulated in the four Memoranda. 
Since taking office, the Bush Administration has used these signing 
statements to claim authority to disobey or ignore the law in more than 
750 situations.203 In an earlier statistical analysis of these signing 
statements, Phillip Cooper found that of the 505 signing statements, 
eighty-two regarded authority to supervise a unitary executive, seventy-
seven pertained to exclusivity of presidential power in foreign affairs, 
forty-eight dealt with presidential power to classify national security 
information and withhold information, and thirty-seven addressed 
commander-in-chief issues.204 Not surprisingly, the signing statements 
clumped around foreign policy and defense issues. Among the more 
prominent signing statements, is one indicating that the president did not 
have to comply with the McCain Amend~ent205 that barred U.S. officials 
from using torture, cruel, and inhuman treatment against prisoners. 206 
These signing statements echo many of the themes addressed in the 
memoranda defending presidential exclusivity and supremacy in foreign 
policy and defense matters. 207 For example, in his signing statement 
addressing the McCain Amendment, Bush asserted: 
201 Phillip J. Cooper, George W Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and Abuse of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRES. STUDIES Q. SIS, 516-20 (2005). 
202ld. 
203 See Charles Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of wws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 
2006, at AI. 
204 Cooper, 35 PRES. STUDIES Q. at 522. 
205 42 V.S.c.A. §§ 2000dd, 2000dd-1 (Westlaw 2008). 
206 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON 
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The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, 
relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch 
and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional 
limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the 
shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title 
X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks. 
Further, in light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, and noting that 
the text and structure of Title X do not create a private right of action 
to enforce Title X, the executive branch shall construe Title X not to 
create a private right of action. Finally, given the decision of the 
Congress reflected in subsections 1005 (e) and 1005(h) that the 
amendments made to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, 
shall apply to past, present, and future actions, including applications 
for writs of habeas corpus, described in that section, and noting that 
section 1005 does not confer any constitutional right upon an alien 
detained abroad as an enemy combatant, the executive branch shall 
construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal courts from exercising 
subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including 
applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1005.208 
225 
Within this statement is an assertion of a unitary presidency and of 
presidential supremacy within foreign and military affairs. In effect, the 
statement indicates a willingness to disregard the Amendment. Thus, 
characteristic of the Bush signing statements that distinguish them from 
previous presidents is that they are not merely ceremonial, rather they 
envision a decision not to comply with the law.209 
Legally, there are several problems with these statements. As the 
American Bar Association points out, there is no constitutional 
authorization for these statements in the sense that they create new 
authority for the president. Either the president can sign or veto a bill, 
but there is no authority to sign and then issue a statement indicating 
unwillingness to comply.2ID A second issue is that even if the president 
can issue these statements, what effect should they be given when the 
courts construe a statute? According to Neil Kinkopf, in Supreme Court 
decisions dating back to John Marshall, a "President's interpretation of 
208 President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza 
Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2005/12120051230-8.html. 
209AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE at 7 -10. 
2101d. ,at5,9, 19. 
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his own authority was not entitled to deference and was to be given no 
weight in construing a statute.,,211 Kinkopf, also points out that 
historically, the Court has interpreted presidential power in foreign 
affairs against a background of international law.212 This interpretive 
strategy is contrary to the understanding of executive power asserted in 
the memoranda. Finally, the authority asserted by Bush in these signing 
statements is contrary to what the Court stated in Cooper v. Aaron213 in 
reference to Marbury v. Madison: "This decision declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law 
of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by 
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system.,,214 Whatever the Bush administration may 
think, its interpretation of the law through these signing statements is 
neither definitive nor controlling upon the judiciary. 
D. SUMMARY 
Overall, the four memoranda discussed above and the signing 
statements rest upon a conception of presidential power that appears to 
place the office beyond congressional or judicial limits or control when it 
comes to national defense or security. Collectively, they give the 
president near unlimited authority to interpret treaties, deploy troops, or 
take any other action to protect national security. As a result of this 
assertion of presidential power, it set the stage not simply for a war on 
terrorism, but one on democracy, constitutionalism, and international 
law. 
How accurate is this sketch of presidential power which is described 
as the unitary executive theory? There is no question that it offers a 
wooden theory of the presidency that emphasizes a strict separation of 
powers model of government. The subsequent Y 00 book concludes that 
the War Powers Act is unconstitutional for the same reason. But more 
troubling are several of Yoo's assumptions. For one, as later articulated 
in his book, Y 00 draws questionable conclusions based upon silence. For 
example, he asserts: "If we think of the allocation of war powers among 
211 Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, SI INDIANA L. 1. 1169, 1190-91 
(2006) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, liS (lS04); Talbot v. 
Seeman, 5 U.S. I Cranch I, 10 (ISOI)). 
212 Kinkopf, SI INDIANA L. 1. at 1192 (citing Schooner Chorming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
at liS). 
213 Cooper v. Aaron, 35S U.S. I (l95S). 
214 Cooper, 35S U.S. at IS (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 
(lS03)). 
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the British and colonial governments as the background on which state 
constitutions were drawn, state silence suggests an acceptance of the 
British approach.,,215 Inferring from silence is always a precarious move, 
and too much of the reasoning of the book does that. 
Another problem with Yoo's analysis is its effort to freeze and 
unfreeze the meaning of the Constitutional text at the same time. Y 00 
starts with questionable discussions of how Hamilton (who barely 
attended the Constitutional Convention and whose views on presidential 
power were not taken seriously even by the framers) viewed the 
Constitution. He then moves to how the ratifiers viewed foreign affairs 
and national security. He then argues that he will not rely as much on 
subsequent case law (which does not consistently support him) to show 
how foreign policy power must be vested in plenary fashion in the 
president while decision making remains open to contemporary 
demands. Each of these steps contains questionable history and dubious 
logic. 
In addition, one is left asking ifs the Constitution's meaning on 
national security issues fixed or open, and if open, why does it seem to 
consistently favor the presidency over Congress? In supporting his view 
of presidential power, Yoo consistently relies upon questionable 
executive department self-interested assertions of authority, with such 
articulations bearing little weight in law or objectivity. Moreover, no 
thought is given either to how American conceptions of constitutionalism 
differed from British views by 1787, or how the Constitution of 1787 and 
it augmentation of power was rebalanced by the subsequent adoption of 
the Bill of Rights in 1791 and future amendments. Overall, as aptly 
stated by Justices Scalia and Stevens dissenting in Hamdi v. Rumsjeld216 
after reviewing the historical efforts in England to limit monarchial 
power and in the American colonies to address the abuses of King 
George III, "A view of the Constitution that gives the Executive 
authority to use military force rather than the force of law ... flies in the 
face of the mistrust that engendered these provisions.,,217 
Conversely, one can invoke text, framers' intent, scholarly 
commentary, and history to refute Yoo. For example, the plain language 
of the text of the Constitution argues against Yoo's claim that Congress 
has a minimal role in foreign policy and war activities. Article I, section 
215 John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum 
Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President Re: The President's Constitutional Authority To 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001) 
[hereinafter Yoo Memoranduml, at 62, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olclwarpowers925.htm. 
216 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
217 Id. at 569 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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8 contains no less than ten clauses that recognize Congress' authority in 
these activities, including the power to declare war. Article II, section 2 
only vests in the president three powers in these areas - serve as 
commander-in-chief, and make treaties and appoint ambassadors - with 
the latter requiring concurrent Senate approval. 218 
The Framers' intent also speaks against Y 00' s interpretations. For 
example, Alexander Hamilton argued at the constitutional convention for 
extensive presidential powers in war making, but even here he noted that 
the executive would have the power "to make war or peace, with the 
advise of the senate.,,219 But later in Federalist No. 69 he downplayed 
presidential power, stating that he would be commander-in-chief "when 
called into actual service of the United States.,,220 Neither of these 
statements seem to support the idea that even Hamilton supported giving 
presidents the power Y 00 asserts. Others, moreover, at the convention221 
and in ratification debates,222 also expressed skepticism and concern 
about vesting war making power in the president. 
Both scholarly analysis and history argue against Y 00' s positions. 
For example, Fisher argues that while the Framers knew of the British 
model to vest war making and military power in the king, they firmly 
rejected doing that both in the Articles of Confederation and in the 
Constitution. 223 In fact, Fisher notes how Article 9 of the Articles of 
Confederation transferred all war and foreign policy power to Congress, 
thereby representing the sharpest indication of their desire to break with 
the British model. 224 Thus, by the time the new Constitution came about, 
executive power in this area was already limited, subject to whatever the 
Convention decided to give back to the president. Moreover, when it 
comes to the phrase "commander-in-chief," both Louis Fisher and Louis 
Henkin contend that this phrase was meant to do no more than to ensure 
that the military remained under civilian control during wars that would 
218 See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
219 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 300 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966) (emphasis added). 
221lTHE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 447 (Modern Library 1937) (emphasis added). 
221 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 6S (quoting James Madison 
indicating that John Rutledge, while preferring a single president, did not want to give him the 
"power of war and peace"); and JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787476 (Adrienne Koch ed., Norton Library 1969) (quoting Roger Sherman: 
"The Executive should be able to repel and not to commence war"). Note also that the convention 
delegates vote to reject giving the president war making power. [d. 
222 Patrick Henry and James Madison Debate Constructive Rights and the Use of the 
Militia, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTlTUTION,70I-03 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (describing how 
only Congress could call out the militia). 
223 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 2 (2004). 
224/d. at 2. 
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be initiated by Congress, and after they authorized the troops. 225 
Whatever history Y 00 offers to support his views, recent events such as 
the passage of the War Powers Act and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, indicate that past acquiescence to giving presidents 
broad leeway in military and foreign policy arenas has met legislative 
disapproval in Congress. 
Finally, one can respond to Yoo and the memoranda by appealing to 
the core values of democracy, constitutionalism, and liberalism. As 
Dyzenhaus argues, there are moral principles operating in the law that 
cover situations similar to what Ronald Dworkin proposed when 
criticizing legal positivism. 226 What this means for Dyzenhaus is that 
emergencies do not create constitutional black holes devoid of legal or 
moral guidance.227 Instead, the exercise of authority, even by the 
president in times of emergencies, should still respect rule of law, the 
concept of checks and balances, and respect for rights. In is 
inconceivable that assertions of a unitary executive unchecked by the 
legislative and judicial branches, and able to disregard rights, are 
compatible with the core values of democracy, constitutionalism, and 
Liberalism. At their core, these values stand for limits on power, 
regardless of who is acting and for what reason. The constitutional 
framers created a president, not a king or dictator, and it is unlikely that 
they would have endorsed this assertion of executive power. Instead, as 
the constitutional provision for the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus demonstrates, the Constitution seems to anticipate emergencies 
and incorporates them into how it operates. Nowhere does the 
Constitution either explicitly or implicitly endorse the idea that its 
provisions operate only in times of peace and tranquility. 
In sum, the four memoranda of the Bush Administration, as well as 
the ideas implicit in the signing statements, rest on very weak 
foundations. They mythologize presidential authority, foisting an image 
of executive power in conflict with democratic, liberal, and constitutional 
values that support limited government, rule of law, and respect for 
individual rights. 
III. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL AND THE COURTS' RESPONSE 
The Bush Administration's war on terrorism can be judged on two 
mId. at 12-14; LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, 23 (1990). 
226 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW 61-62 (2006). See also RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 27 (1978). 
227 DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LA W at 61-62, 196-200. 
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fronts. First, one can ask if the terrorists have won. President Bush said 
that the object of the terrorists was to "force us to change our way of life, 
is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be what we're not.,,228 Has the 
war on terrorism precipitated a war on democracy, including basic civil 
liberties? Taken together, the Patriot Act and the presidential assertions 
of power do threaten American democracy, and the Supreme Court has 
responded, although not directly, with a mixed record of rejecting many 
of Bush's claims. 
Second, one can judge the war on democracy in terms of success. 
Have President Bush's efforts led to the capture and conviction of 
terrorists? For the most part, the war on terrorism has not produced the 
capture or conviction of major al Qaeda or Taliban principals, and it has 
also thwarted international cooperation in securing the same. 
Thus far the United States Supreme Court has ruled in four cases 
addressing legal issues stemming from the war on terrorism and the 
president's assertion of presidential power. In the first three, the Court 
has generally rejected Bush's broad claims of presidential authority, 
although a majority of the Justices have been unwilling to directly 
challenge assertions of a unitary president and supremacy in foreign 
affairs and war making powers. In addition to the Supreme Court, 
several lower courts have also heard various challenges to legal claims 
arising out of the war on terror, yielding few victories for President 
Bush.229 
A. HAMDI V. RUMSFEW 
In Hamdi v. Rumsjeld230 the Supreme Court ruled that an American 
citizen could not be held indefinitely on American soil without a right to 
habeas corpus review. The decision limited the ability of the President to 
detain American citizens in the war on terrorism after September 11, 
2001, and it reaffirmed the basic right of Americans to have a judge 
determine whether they have been illegally detained. 
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghanistan, 
and was classified as an "enemy combatant" because he had supposedly 
228 See President's Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders and an 
Exchange With Reporters, 37 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 1538 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl20011l0/20011023-33.htm!. 
229 American Civil Liberties Union v. National Sec.Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (D. 
Mich. 2006) (ruling unconstitutional the president's warrant less electronic surveillance program, 
finding that it violated both the First and Fourth Amendments). The decision was later vacated on 
standing reasons by the Sixth Circuit in 2007. American Civil Liberties Union v. National 
Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007). 
230 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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taken up arms against the United States.231 Hamdi was placed in 
indefinite detention in a naval brig in South Carolina, and denied access 
to legal counsel. Hamdi's father sought habeas corpus review for his son 
in federal court, claiming that the incarceration violated the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.232 The district court ruled in favor of Hamdi, 
ordering him released, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hamdi was entitled to a 
hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine the factual basis for 
why he was being held and remanded for such a hearing.233 
Justice O'Connor wrote for a four person plurality that also included 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. In this 
opinion O'Connor fIrst stated that: "The threshold question before us is 
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as 
"enemy combatants.,,234 O'Connor indicated the president asserted that 
he has inherent Article II authority to detain individuals, but the Court 
decided not to address this issue, instead it focused on whether the 
detention is permitted, pursuant to the September 18 congressional 
Authorization to Use Military Force ("AUMF,,).235 Citing Ex parte 
Quirin236 for the proposition that American citizens may be held as 
enemy combatants,237 the plurality stated that Congress could not do this 
indefinitely. 238 Moreover, even recognizing the power of Congress to 
fIght the war on terrorism and authorize the detention of those considered 
to be enemy combatants, the opinion noted that the basic principles of 
federal habeas corpus law grant American citizens being detained on 
American soil-even though captured on foreign soil during combat-
some right to contest the factual basis for why they are being 
incarcerated.239 
Justice O'Connor also addressed a second claim made by the 
president that the courts should not second guess him when it comes to 
decisions made regarding military matters. While acknowledging the 
important separation of powers argument here and the respect that the 
courts ought to afford the president when it comes to sensitive foreign 
2311d. at 510. 
232 542 ld. at 510-11. 
233 1d. at 509. 
234 ld. at 516. 
235 1d. at 516-17 (noting how Congress did authorize Hamdi's detention with the AUMF). 
236 317 U.S. I, 20 (1942). 
237 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519. 
238 1d. at 520-23. 
239ld. at 525. 
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policy and military matters,240 O'Connor stated that the interest Hamdi 
had in the protection of his rights outweighed the interest the government 
had in detaining him without granting access to the courtS.241 In short, 
O'Connor and the four person plurality opinion did not see judicial 
review of Hamdi's detention as posing a major threat or having a "dire 
impact" upon the government's war making functions. 242 
In sum, Justice O'Connor's opinion rejected many of the separation 
of powers arguments made by President Bush, including those related to 
minimal questioning of an expansive presidential power by the courts: 
[W]e necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts 
in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo 
any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the 
legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any 
reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only 
to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long 
since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S., at 587, 72 S.Ct. 863. Whatever 
power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its 
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of 
conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when 
individual liberties are at stake.243 
For the plurality, the "war power does not remove constitutional 
limitations safeguarding essentialliberties,,,244 thereby placing a limit on 
any congressional authority to detain Hamdi. 
In a separate concurrence, Justices Souter and Ginsburg generally 
agreed with the O'Connor opinion, but they also questioned whether the 
congressional resolution authorized Hamdi's detention.245 Specifically, 
they cite the Non-Detention Act246 (18 U.S.c. § 4001(a)) which places 
limits upon the ability of Congress to authorize the detention of 
American citizens. 247 This act, passed in response to the internment of 
240 ld. at 527 (describing the Bush Administration's position as the "most extreme 
rendition" of a separation of powers argument). 
241 ld. at 533. 
242ld. 
243 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36. 
244 ld. at 536. 
245 ld. at 541. 
246 18 U.S.C.A § 4001 (a) (Westlaw 2008). 
247 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542. 
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Japanese-Americans during World War II, requires very clear and 
manifest authority by Congress before the president could detain 
American citizens. In this case, Souter and Ginsburg did not see that 
clear authority in the AUMF. 248 
Finally, in dissent, Justices Scalia and Stevens take an even stronger 
position than the plurality and concurring opinions when it comes to the 
constitutionality of Hamdi being held without review. For Scalia and 
Stevens, each writing their own concurrence, a trial for treason is the 
traditional way to try citizens who have waged war against the United 
States.249 If this option is not selected, then every citizen is entitled to a 
habeas corpus review of the reasons of detention, unless Congress has 
suspended that right.25o Given that Congress had not suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus, the dissent concluded that the AUMF cannot permit an 
indefinite detention of an American citizen.251 Moreover, the Scalia 
dissent also rejects the contention that the president, even in wartime, has 
the power to order an indefinite detention of a citizen.252 
B. RASUL V. BUSH 
The Hamdi opinion was issued the same day that Rasul v. Bush253 
was decided. In Rasul v. Bush the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that aliens being held in confinement at the American military base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were entitled to have a federal court hear 
challenges to their detention under the federal habeas corpus statute. 
As a result of United States military action after 9-11 in Afghanistan 
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, approximately 640 non-Americans 
were captured and then relocated to the United States military base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where they were held indefinitely, and without 
access to legal counsel and the federal courtS.254 Among those detained, 
claiming innocence, and wishing to be freed, were Shafiq Rasul and 
Fawzi Khallid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, neither of whom were United 
States citizens.255 
Relatives of these two individuals filed actions in U.S. District 
248 1d. at 54748. 
2491d. at 554. 
2SO /d. 
251/d. at 573-74. 
mid. at 568 (stating that the "proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime 
detention authority over citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power 
permanently at the Executive's disposal"). 
m 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
254 /d. at 470-72. 
mid. 
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Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the detentions. First the 
federal district court and then the Ccourt of Aappeals for the District of 
Columbia dismissed the cases, claiming that the courts lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the challenges. In both of these cases relatives of the 
detainees sought habeas corpus review, but it was denied.256 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens ruled that these detainees 
were entitled to a review of their detention. Stevens first noted that 
habeas corpus is the constitutional right of individuals to have a judge 
review the reasons why a person has been detained.257 Habeas corpus is 
the legal means individuals may use to challenge what they think may be 
an illegal imprisonment by requesting that the person holding them 
explain to a judge the reasons for their confinement. Both Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, as well as 28 U.S.c. § 2241 
provide for habeas corpus review. 258 While the law is well established 
that American citizens being held in the United States are entitled to 
habeas corpus review, there seemed to be some uncertainty regarding 
whether noncitizens held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba enjoyed habeas 
review. 259 
One issue is was the status of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and 
whether it was sovereign territory of the United States. In 1934 Cuba 
granted the United States a lease to Guantanamo Bay so long as the 
based was being used. In turn, the United States recognized Cuba's 
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay?60 Stevens concluded that the control 
of the base by the United States was so "plenary and exclusive,,261 that 
while Guantanamo Bay was not sovereign territory of the United States, 
it was still under its jurisdiction and therefore the ruling in Johnson v. 
Eisentrager262 did not apply.263 In Eisentrager the Court had ruled that 
the courts lacked jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to German citizens 
captured by U.S. forces in China who were tried and convicted of war 
crimes by an American military commission headquartered in Nanking, 
and then incarcerated in occupied Germany?64 In distinguishing the 
facts in that case from Rasul, the Court stated: 
2561d. at 472-73. 
2571d. at 473. 
258 1d. 
259 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475. 
260 Id. at 480. 
2611d. at 475. 
262 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
263 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76. 
264 Id. at 476. 
40
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss2/2
2008] DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 
Petitioners here differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important 
respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the United 
States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of 
aggression against this country; they have never been afforded access 
to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; 
and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory 
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and 
control. 265 
235 
This thus meant that habeas review was available to those at 
Guantanamo Bay and all those detained there were entitled to challenge 
their detention. 
C. RUMSFIELD V. PADILLA 
Rumsfield v. Padilla was the third of three Supreme Court decisions 
ruling an individual being held in detention by the United States and 
suspected as a terrorist must receive a hearing?66 Jose Padilla was an 
American citizen detained in Chicago by the Bush Administration after 
he had returned from Pakistan. He was then transported to New York 
and placed in federal custody under a warrant issued by a grand jury 
investigating the 9-11 bombings.267 Padilla obtained a lawyer and sought 
to contest his detention. While his motion was pending, the Bush 
Administration designated him an enemy combatant and placed him in 
military custody in South Carolina.268 He was so designated because the 
government believed that he wished to set off a "dirty bomb" in the 
United States in cooperation or on behest of al-Qaeda. The Bush 
Administration justified his detention based both on the president's 
power as commander in chief and the congressional A UMF of 
September 18, 2001.269 Padilla sought habeas review in federal district 
court in New York City, naming as respondents President Bush, 
Secretary Rumsfeld, and Navy Commander Melanie A. Marr, 
commander of the South Carolina facility. 270 The government sought 
dismissal of the petition, claiming both that only Marr was a proper 
respondent and that the New York court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
case. 271 
265 Id. 
266 542 u.s. at 426 (2004). 
2671d. at 430-1. 
2681d. at 430. 
2(f} Id. at 431. 
270Id. at 433. 
271 1d. 
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The district court ruleding that the president could detain Padilla 
and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition.272 The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding both that the Secretary of Defense 
was the appropriate respondent for habeas and that the President had no 
authority to detain Padilla militarily. 273 
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding only the jurisdictional issues 
in the case and not whether the president has the authority to detain 
Padilla. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that the 
federal habeas law was clear in stating that the appropriate respondent is 
"the person who has custody over [the petitioner].,,274 This respondent or 
person must be the one who could actually produce the detained 
individual before the court.275 The respondent is also the one who has 
direct physical control over the person filing the habeas petition.276 Since 
only Marr had this type of relationship to Padilla, she was the only 
proper habeas respondent, and not Bush or Rumsfield.277 
Next, having determined that Marr was the proper respondent, 
Rehnquist then indicated that a court may only grant habeas petitions 
"within their respective jurisdictions.,,278 Jurisdiction for habeas is also 
fixed to the place where one is physically confined.279 Thus, the proper 
place for Padilla to bring his petition was in the district court of South 
Carolina were he was detained, with Marr as the respondent.28o As a 
result, the Second Circuit opinion was reversed. 
After the Supreme Court decision, Padilla refiled for habeas corpus 
review in South Carolina and the district court ruled that he was detained 
illegally and that he should be criminally charged or released. 281 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 282 Relying upon the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Congress had 
authorized the president to detain Padilla with its September 18, 2001 
AUMF.283 Padilla then sought review of the Fourth Circuit decision,284 
and in response, the government charged Padilla, asked the Fourth 
272 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432·33. 
273 ld. at 433. 
274 ld. at 434 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 2242). 
275 ld. 
276 ld. at 437-38. 
277 ld. at 441-442. 
278 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 2241 (a». 
279 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442. 
280 !d. at 451. 
281 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F.Supp.2d. 678 (D.S.C. 2005). 
282 Padilla v Hanft, 423 F. 3d. 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
283 Padilla, 423 F. 3d at 391. 
284 Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) cert. denied. 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss2/2
2008] DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 237 
Circuit to vacate their decision, and then sought to transfer him from a 
military to a civilian facility. The Fourth Circuit refused the request to 
transfer and vacate,285 contending that all this was done simply to avoid 
Supreme Court review: 
We believe that the transfer of Padilla and the withdrawal of our 
opinion at the government's request while the Supreme Court is 
reviewing this court's decision of September 9 would compound what 
is, in the absence of explanation, at least an appearance that the 
government may be attempting to avoid consideration of our decision 
by the Supreme Court, and also because we believe that this case 
presents an issue of such especial national importance as to warrant 
final consideration by that court, even if only by denial of further 
review, we deny both the motion and suggestion. If the natural 
progression of this significant litigation to conclusion is to be 
pretermitted at this late date under these circumstances, we believe 
that decision should be made not by this court but, rather, by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.286 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed, granted the transfer, and 
acknowledged that a petition for a review of the Fourth Circuit habeas 
decision was still under review. 287 Eventually, the Court refused to grant 
certiorari in the matter, leaving Padilla in the hands of a civilian court to 
review the charges against him. 
D. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD 
Of the four Supreme Court opinions thus far testing presidential 
power to conduct the war on terrorism after 9-11, Hamdan v. Rumsjeld288 
is the latest and most direct rejection of executive authority to sidestep 
constitutional protections for individual liberties. In this case Salim 
Ahmed Hamdan was a Yemeni national who was captured by American 
armed forces in Afghanistan in November, 2001.289 He was 
subsequently turned over to the military and in June, 2002 was 
transferred to Guantanamo Bay for detention. He was held without 
charges for two years until the the government finally decided to try him 
for conspiracy before a military commission.290 Hamdan sought habeas 
285 Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005). 
286 ld. 
287 Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.C!. 978 (2006). 
288 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
289ld. at 2759. 
290 ld. at 2759. 
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review to challenge his detention and also mandamus to question his 
proposed trial. 291 His arguments were based on two claims: first, that the 
commission set up to try him was illegal and, second, that the procedures 
to be used in the trial violated basic rules of military and international 
law.292 A district court had ruled in his favor, it was reversed by the 
court of appeals, and upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, Justice 
Stevens wrote a plurality opinion in favor of Hamdan. 
In arguing in favor of both Hamdan's detention and the trial 
procedures, the government offered several arguments. First, the 
government contended that a November 13, 2001 presidential order 
permitted it to detain and try Hamdan in the manner at issue here.293 
This November 13 order allowed the president to detain "any noncitizen 
for whom the President determines 'there is reason to believe' that he or 
she (1) 'is or was' a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or 
participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United 
States," and to have them tried by a military commission created by the 
Secretary of Defense. 294 When Hamdan requested a speedy trial under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") he was informed that 
none of the provisions in the UCMJ applied to his detention, pursuant to 
the November 13 Order.295 This Order is ultimately supported, for the 
government, by the AUMF.296 The second argument the government 
used to attack Hamdan's assertions is based upon to the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 ("DT A,,)297 which it contended removed Court 
jurisdiction to hear this case.298 
The Court fIrst addressed the DTA argument. Subsection (e) of 
section 1005 of the DT A states that: "Except as provided in section 1005 
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider - (1) an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus fIled by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.,,299 On it face, 
subsection (e) appeared to preclude the court from reviewing Hamden's 
habeas petition. However, Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion, 
291 [d. 
292 /d. at 2759. 
293 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13,2001). 
294 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2760 (citing Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.Reg. at 57834). 
295 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2760. 
296 /d. at 2775. 
297 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub.L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). 
298 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2763-4. 
299 Detainee Treatment Act §§ 1005(e)(I) (internal quotations omitted). 
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rejected the use of constitutional claims and instead used statutory 
construction tools to dismiss the government's position. 3OO Specifically, 
he pointed out that while paragraphs two and three of this section of the 
DT A (which are not directly at issue in this case and which address 
judicial review of other matters relating to detainees) are governed by the 
language which make the act take effect immediately upon passage to 
claims already pending,301 there is no language in the act that appears to 
make the DT A retroactive to claims such as the one Hamdan brought 
under paragraph one (which is at issue in this case).302 The government's 
position was that this omission was not significant since the DT A 
withdrew all jurisdiction from the court regarding the detainees, and 
therefore there is a presumption here that unless the judiciary was given 
authority to hear these cases, Congress had taken it away.303 However, 
Stevens rejected this in favor of another presumption, the rule against 
retroactivity, in certain cases, especially those involving alteration of 
jurisdiction.304 The failure of Congress to expressly state that paragraph 
one had retroactive effect while saying so for paragraphs two and three 
was seen as suggesting a clear intent by Congress not to make it apply to 
cases already in the process, such as Hamden's.305 Thus, the Court 
turned back the DT A argument as a way to prevent it from hearing this 
case. 
Turning to the November 13 Order, the Court noted that military 
commissions are not mentioned in the Constitution, but instead are an 
artifact of military necessity and exigency.306 Yet Justice Stevens stated 
that: "Exigency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment and 
use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article I, § 8 and Article III, § 
1 of the Constitution unless some other part of that document authorizes 
a response to the felt need. ,,307 The Court first raised and then 
sidestepped whether the president's power as commander-in-chief would 
provide authorization to create these commissions.308 Instead it argued 
that Congress has authorized the creation of these commissions through 
its war-making powers, specifically by enacting the UCMJ.309 In 
300 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2764. 
301 1d. (citing Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(h». 
302 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2763. 
303 /d. at 2764. 
3(}1 /d. at 2764-5. 
305 /d. at 2765-6. 
306 /d. at 2772-3. 
307 /d. at 2773. 
308 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2774. 
309 /d. 
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addition, even if the president has independent authority to create these 
commissions, the Court declared that, "[H]e may not disregard 
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, 
placed on his powers.,,310 The government's position then is that either 
the DTA or the AUMF have expanded the president's authority to create 
commissions, thereby providing the support for his November 13 
order.311 The Court found nothing in either that served to expand the 
president's authority beyond that already listed in the UCMJ.312 
Having rejected presidential claims of authority to create military 
tribunals with specified trial procedures, the Court then turned to the 
charges the commissions will use to try Hamden and other detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay. It noted that all parties in this case agreed that there is 
a body of common law that appears to govern procedures governing 
military commissions,313 and that includes some allegation that the 
person facing trial has breached some law or rule against the conduct of 
war. 314 After a lengthy analysis of the events of and after 9-11 and 
Hamden's role in them, the Court concluded that the 
Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for which 
it seeks to try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to 
be an offense against the law of war. That burden is far from satisfied 
here. The crime of "conspiracy" has rarely if ever been tried as such 
in this country by any law-of-war military commission not exercising 
some other form of jurisdiction, and does not appear in either the 
Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions-the major treaties on 
the law of war. 315 
The Court rejected examples cited by the government as instances 
where conspiracy was tried before these type of tribunals/16 and it also 
(1952)). 
310 [d. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 
311 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2775. 
312 [d. 
313!d. at 2777. 
314 Id. at 2780-1. 
315 [d. 
316 [d. at 2781-84. Specifically, the Court rejected the government's contention that Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) supported their argument that military commissions may try 
conspiracy charges because the defendants in that case were charged with that offense. The Court in 
Hamdan responded to this argument by stating that saboteurs were being tried for other offenses in 
addition to conspiracy and the Court never ruled on the conspiracy issue. 126 S.Ct.at 2782. 
According to Justice Stevens, "If anything, Quirin supports Hamdan's argument that conspiracy is 
not a violation of the law of war. Not only did the Court pointedly omit any discussion of the 
conspiracy charge, but its analysis of Charge I placed special emphasis on the completion of an 
offense; it took seriously the saboteurs' argument that there can be no violation of a law of war-at 
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pointed out that there are no treaties or international law that would 
permit this either. 317 
Finally, Justice Stevens looked at the rules of evidence and trial 
procedures to be used to try Hamdan. He noted that hearsay may be 
admitted, the defendant could be denied access to examine this evidence, 
and that he could be convicted with a two-thirds verdict. 318 All of these 
procedural and evidentiary rules are both contrary to what is provided in 
the UCMJ319 and in international covenants such as the Third Geneva 
Convention of 1949.320 
As a last point, the Court also rejected contentions by the 
government that the Geneva Convention does not apply to Hamdan 
because that international agreement applies only to states and not to 
individuals who are members of al Qaeda, which is not a government. 321 
Essentially this is the claim that the government made in its Detainee 
Memorandum. Without directly rejecting this claim, the Court pointed 
out that some parts of these conventions, known as Common Article 3, 
apply to everyone, including individuals such as Hamdan, who are not 
attached to any government. 322 This article, the Court found, precluded 
Hamdan from being tried by the special commissions the president has 
created in his November 13 Order because "Common Article 3, then, is 
applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by 
a 'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.",323 Having found 
that the commissions authorized by the November 13 Order lacked these 
minimum guarantees, the Court also refused to recognize the procedures 
to be used to try Hamden to be satisfactory. 
Overall, the Hamdan opinion is to date the most forceful rejection 
of presidential authority to conduct the war on terrorism. While it does 
not directly reject inherent presidential powers to act, it suggests clear 
least not one triable by military commission-without the actual commission of or attempt to 
commit a "hostile and warlike act." Id. In several places in Hamdan Justice Stevens attacked the 
Quirin precedent as supporting the government's arguments or uses it again them. See, e.g., 126 
S.Ct. at 2773 (citing Quirin as supporting the proposition that "Congress and the President, like the 
courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution"). See also loUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, 205-8 (2004) (discussing how Quirin is not precedent for Bush's 
military tribunals). 
317 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2784. 
3I8 ld. at 2786-7. 
319 1d. at 2790 n.47. 
320 Id. at 2790-1, 2793. 
3211d. at 2795. 
322 1d. 
323 Hamdan, 126 S.C!. at 2796. 
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limits to it, both in terms of what AUMF permitted, as well as in terms of 
international law. The opinion also suggested that like it or not, 
international law is binding on the United States, and contrary to the 
assertions made in the four memoranda, the president does not get the 
last word in terms in war and foreign policy matters. 
E. SUMMARY 
As a result of the sagas of Hamdi, Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdaen, 
several conclusions can be drawn. First, citizens or non-citizens detained 
on American soil are entitled to a habeas hearing to contest their 
confinement. Eight Justices in three opinions in Hamdi agreed to this 
proposition, while six Justices in two opinions (one including a five 
person majority) in Rasul agreed. In Hamdan, five Justices in two 
opinions agreed on this point. Only one Justice (Thomas in Hamdi) thus 
far has ruled on the merits that the president has inherent authority to 
detain individuals, while five Justices (a four person plurality plus 
Thomas) in Hamdi have held that the AUMF authorizes detention. 
Conversely, four Justices in two opinions in Hamdi reject the theory that 
the AUMF permits the detention and five Justices in Hamdan drew clear 
limits to what the AUMF authorizes and what the president may do. 
Overall, the Court seems to be shying away from the inherent 
presidential power claims raised by the Y 00 and other three Department 
of Justice or White House Counsel memoranda, and is of mixed but 
skeptical opinion on the congressional authorization claim. 
Yet even with the congressional authorization, only Thomas seems 
prepared to reject judicial review of any detention, with the rest of the 
Court prepared to argue that the AUMF does not abrogate the 
constitutional protections individuals have. For now, the Court seems to 
be siding with protection of individual rights, rejecting Bush's claims. 
The Court also seems to be unwilling to accept claims that the 
presidential has unlimited foreign policy and war powers, that he does 
not get the final say in these matters, that international law is binding, 
and the Congress and the judiciary still have a role to play after 9-11. 
For now, the Constitution and federal law still applies and limits 
presidential power. Finally, the Bush Administration has generally not 
been successful in other court proceedings related to the war on 
terrorism. For example, a former professor Sami al-Arian was tried on 
fifty-one counts related to government claims that he and others were 
fronting for Palestinian terrorists. A jury acquitted on eight counts and 
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deadlocked on the others. 324 In addition, since President Bush declared 
the war on terrorism, no principles have been convicted yet. The sole 
conviction thus far was Zacarias Moussaoui, the so called "twentieth 
hijacker" in 9-11 who pled guilty on April 22, 2005 to terrorist charges 
brought against him. However, while acknowledging ties to al Qaeda, he 
denied any connection to 9-11, and it does not appear that he was a 
principle or major player in any terrorist organization. 
In addition, in AI-Marri v. Wright the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Military Commissions Act which denied habeas to 
enemy combatants did not apply to the detainee in question. 325 
Moreover, and more importantly, the Court rejected claims by the 
administration that the president had inherent authority to order the 
seizure and indefinite detention of a civilian. In reaching the merits of 
AI-Marri's detention claim the Court dismissed arguments that AUMF 
authorized the detention. 326 More importantly, the Fourth Circuit directly 
rejected the claims of inherent presidential powers as commander-in-
chief to detain a civilian.327 In the Court's words: 
To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize 
and indefinitely detain civilians, even if the President calls them 
"enemy combatants," would have disastrous consequences for the 
Constitution-and the country. For a court to uphold a claim to such 
extraordinary power would do more than render lifeless the 
Suspension Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the rights to criminal 
process in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments; it would 
effectively undermine all of the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution. It is that power-were a court to recognize it-that could 
lead all our laws "to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to 
pieces." We refuse to recognize a claim to power that would so alter 
the constitutional foundations of our Republic. 328 
However, while in AI-Marri the Fourth Circuit refused to endorse 
the denial of habeas, in both Boumediene v. Bush329 and Al Odah v. 
United States the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld 
congressional authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to 
deny jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions for Guantanamo Bay 
324 Eric Lichtblau. Non Guilt Verdict in Florida Terror Trial are Setbacks for U.S .• N. Y. 
TIMES. Dec. 7,2005, at AI. 
m 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). 
31h ld. at 177-78, 184. 
m ld. at 190-95. 
328 ld. at 195. 
329 476 F.3d 98 I (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007). 
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prisoners.33o Here, the Court did not rule on claims of inherent 
presidential power or authority under AUMF, but instead ruled that the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 did not violation the Suspensions 
Clause in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution. In June, 
2007, the Supreme Court voted to grant certiorari. in the case. 
Additionally, in June, 2007, a military judge dismissed charges against 
Hamdan and the only other Guantanamo prisoner facing trial.33l 
Finally, in American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security 
Agencl32 a Michigan district court struck down as unconstitutional the 
president's warrantless electronic surveillance program, finding that it 
violated both the First and Fourth Amendments. More importantly, this 
case rejected the government's claims that the president has inherent 
authority to authority this type of surveillance. However, a Sixth Circuit 
decision overturned the decision, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
because they had failed to demonstrate an injury.333 
Overall, up to this point while lower courts have rejected the unitary 
executive theory, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on its merits, opting 
instead to find other reasons to limit presidential authority. Whether that 
will continue to be the trend after the Court rules in the Boumediene and 
Al Odah cases is open for debate, especially light of the ascension of 
Justices Roberts and Alito to it. 
IV. EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Assessment of the war on terrorism and democracy does not end at 
the American borders. It also encompasses the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Germany and the entire European Union. Yet they way each responded 
varied significantly from the response in the United States. 
A. TONY BLAIR AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
After the terrorist attacks of 9-11, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
appeared to be Bush's biggest ally. He supported the war on terrorism 
by offering troops to aid the United States in Afghanistan and by urging 
the ouster of Saddam Hussein from Iraq. His government voted 
consistently in the United Nations for the enforcement of resolutions to 
2007). 
330 Id. 
331 Jess Bravin, Terror War Legal Edifice Teeters, WALL ST. J., June 13,2007, at A4. 
332 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (D. Mich. 2006). 
333 American Civil Liberties Union v. National Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 
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destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and he provided significant 
military aid to support Bush's war on terrorism. 
One reward for his support for these efforts were a series of terrorist 
bombings of the London Underground on July 7, 2005 that were linked 
to al Qaeda.334 Perhaps in response to the attack, Blair's government 
proposed changing the law, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security 
Act,335 that then allowed suspected terrorists to be detained without 
charges for 14 days, to 90 days. His bill also would have made it illegal 
for some types of "glorification" or incitement or advocacy of terrorist 
acts.336 Contrary to what happened in the United States where Congress 
quickly passed the Patriot Act, Blair lost. His own Labor government 
refused to support these measures and instead only supported detainment 
without charges for 28 daYS.337 
In addition, as in the United States, the British courts also responded 
to the war on terrorism by rebuking torture and other deprivations of 
individual rights. In FC and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department the House of Lords ruled that the common law barred the 
use of evidence obtained by torture. 338 The Law Lords saw this rule not 
as evidentiary but constitutional, contending that "from the earliest days 
the common law of England sets it face firmly against the use of 
torture.,,339 While this decision seemed to place some limits on how 
suspected terrorists would be treated, in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. JJ, a British High Court struck down a government tactic 
used against terrorists, house arrests without trials. 340 At issue was a 
provision of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which permitted the 
house arrest without trial of individuals suspected of being terrorists?41 
Justice Jeremy Sullivan who presided over this case, ruled that this 
provision of the Act violated Article 5(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which provides that "Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
334 London rocked by terror attacks, BBC NEWS, July 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.ukl 
\lhi/ukl4659093.stm. 
335 HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 356 (2005). 
336 BBC News, Q & A: Blair's terror bill defeat, BBC NEWS, Nov. 9, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/uk_politicsl4421726.stm. 
3371d. 
338 [2005) UKHL 71, [2006) 2 A.C. 221 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K). 
339 1d. at'll II. 
340 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. 11, [2006) EWHC 1623 (Admin) (Q.B.). 
341 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 § 3(10) (U.K.). 
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following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law .... ,,342 
In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department the House of 
Lords held that the indefinite detention of aliens under section 23 of the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 - a detention policy 
similar to the one George Bush ordered for individuals at Guantanamo 
Bay - violated the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act. 343 However, in the case of all of the policies thus 
far before the Hight Courthad been presented by the government under 
an argument similar to the Unitary Executive theory as in the United 
States. In part this is because of the absence of a separation of powers 
style government in the United Kingdom. In addition, critical to the 
reasoning, at least in the case of A v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, was international law (Convention on Human Rights) in 
binding the government.344 Finally, unlike the United States Supreme 
Court which thus far has been willing to directly confront claims of 
inherent presidential power, the House of Lords has surprisingly 
dismissed any parliamentary supremacy claims, finding instead that 
national or international commitments to human rights bar torture or 
indefinite detention. 
Overall, as in the United States, the British judiciary seems 
unwilling in some case to let the specter of terrorism equate to an 
unlimited governmental authority at the expense of individual rights. 
B. SPAIN 
On March 11, 2004, mere days before national parliamentary 
elections, terrorists bombed Madrid train stations, killing nearly 200 
individuals. 345 Originally the Spanish President Jose Aznar blamed the 
attacks on Basque Separatists, but soon it was learned that the attacks 
were also linked to al-Qaeda. Aznar supported Bush's war on terrorism, 
voting to support the invasion of Iraq at the United Nations and 
deploying troops in assistance of that effort. His stance was unpopular in 
Spain, and Socialist presidential candidate Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
pledged to withdraw the troops if elected.346 It was this opposition to the 
342 II at'll II. 
343 [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). See also Human 
Rights Act, 1998. c. 42 (U.K.); Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 (U.K.). 
344 II at'll II. 
345 Scores die in Madrid bomb carnage, BBC NEWS, Mar. II, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl 
2Ihi1europel3500452.stm. 
346 Spain threatens Iraq troop pull-out, BBC NEWS, Mar. 15,2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl 
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troop deployment, and the belief that Aznar lied about who was 
responsible for the Madrid bombings these factors are largely credited 
with Aznar's defeat and the election of a leftist government. 347 As a 
result, Zapatero and Spain have made no changes in detention or criminal 
laws to respond to the war on terrorism. 
C. GERMANY 
The only trial thus far that had resulted in the conviction of a 
terrorist definitely linked to al Qaeda and perhaps 9-11 events occurred 
in Germany. 348 However, the German Federal Court of Justice 
overturned that conviction, on fair trial grounds. 349 The basis of the 
ruling was that the United States had failed to turn over to the defense 
exculpatory evidence. 350 
D. EUROPEAN UNION 
Finally, two last events affecting the EU nations in general have 
arisen as a result of the war on terror that test their commitment to 
democracy and America's efficacy to defeat al Qaeda. First, allegations 
surfaced in 2005 that the CIA was possibly operating torture camps in 
several EU nations, perhaps including Poland or other former Eastern 
Bloc nations.35 I Such camps, if they exist, would certainly violate the 
ECHR. 352 Second, EU members, concerned about allegations of torture, 
and also about the United States' use of the death penalty, increasingly 
have become more concerned about extraditing suspected terrorists to 
America. 353 
The combined result of the stories about torture, the death penalty, 
2lhi/europeJ3512144.stm. 
347 Aznar scorns Madrid 'bomb lies'. BBC NEWS, Nov. 29. 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl 
2lhi/europeJ405070 I.stm. 
348 HELEN DUFFY. THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 377 (2005). 
349 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH) [Federal Court of Justice) Mar. 3, 2004, Strafberteitiger, StV 
4/2004 (F.R.G). 
3lO DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 
377. 
3S1 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons. WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005. 
at AI. 
m Craig Whitlock. Europe Wants Allswers 011 CIA Camps, WASH. POST, Nov.4, 2005, at 
AI (noting European criticism that the CIA torture camps are illegal and may violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
m Lisbeth Kirk, Europeall Courts May Challellge US Terror Renditions, EU OBSERVER, 
Nov. 14, 2005, http://euobserver.coml9120314??print=l. 
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and even the failure on the United States to cooperate on the sharing of 
exculpatory evidence may suggest a toughening of a resolve of EU 
nations to fight terrorism without sacrificing democracy and individual 
rights, while at the same time America's approach may hurt both efforts 
to secure international cooperation to defeat terrorism and uphold 
democracy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The event of 9111 and subsequent Western responses to terrorism 
have challenged basic commitments to democracy, constitutionalism, 
and liberalism in Europe and the United States. Across the states in 
these areas one such challenge emerged with the decision to collapse law 
enforcement into foreign policy and confront terrorism by military and 
not criminal law means. This merger of two traditionally distinct policy 
areas has come at the sacrifice of individual rights, at least in the United 
States, with little to show for it. Several years out, no majors or terrorist 
principals have been convicted, and the mythology of presidential power 
that Bush has constructed to justify his actions has met with limited 
judicial support in the United States. In addition, when compared to the 
responses of other EU nations, his actions have led to a reversal of a 
conviction in Germany and assertions that the United States is in 
violation of international law. In England and Spain, two other victims 
of terrorist attacks, they have generally not sacrificed rights to security, 
with the House of Lords (sitting as a court) and Parliament rejecting 
torture and extended detention policies along the lines advocated by the 
Bush Administration. 
Bush's war on terrorism has turned out to be a war on democracy, 
both in terms of the attack on human rights, and also in assertions of 
extra-constitutional executive authority. If we judge the efficacy of this 
war by Bush's own words-"The object of terrorism is to try to force us 
to change our way of life, is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be 
what we're not"-then the terrorists may win unless both Congress and 
the courts reject his theory of the unitary executive and the approach to 
national security he has articulated.354 
354 See also EMANUEL GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORISM: 
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KiNGDOM, AND ISRAEL 258 (2006) (concluding 
that: "When the state itself undermines the foundations of its own democratic regime in the name of 
its war against terror, what just cause can it assert in pursuance of its fight against those who seek the 
very same reSUlt?"). 
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